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Courts as Information Intermediaries:
A Case Study of Sovereign Debt Disputes
Sadie Blanchard*
It’s well known there’s always two sides, if no more; else who’d go
to law, I should like to know?
— George Eliot, Middlemarch (1872)
When foreign sovereigns default on their debt, creditors sometimes sue
them. These creditors are sophisticated actors, and they know that if they
sue, courts can do little to force a sovereign to satisfy a judgment. Why do
they sue? This Article argues that these creditors sue because they use
litigation to produce information about the debtor state or its government
that induces third parties to sanction or refuse to deal with the state or the
government. The ability to produce such information strengthens the
litigating creditors’ bargaining position in settlement negotiations.
Courts thus serve as information intermediaries that strengthen
reputational enforcement in the international sovereign debt market. The
Article presents a case study that includes interviews with market
participants and their lawyers to show three ways in which courts play
this informational role. First, courts publicly determine whether a
sovereign debtor has violated its legal obligations to creditors. Second,
through discovery and fact finding, courts mitigate information
asymmetries concerning aspects of sovereign behavior related to default
that are difficult to monitor. Third, they provide a forum in which creditors
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I would like to thank the
following for valuable comments and conversations: Lisa Bernstein, Sam Bray, John Coyle,
Rick Brooks, Mitu Gulati, Cathy Hwang, Matt Jennejohn, Ben Johnson, Jon Macey, Daniel
Markovits, Minor Myers, Kishanthi Parella, David Schleicher, Aaron Simowitz, Michael
Tomz, George Triantis, Mark Weidemaier, and participants in the Information Society
Project’s Fellows Workshop, Washington & Lee Law School Reputation Roundtable, the
Interdisciplinary Sovereign Debt Research and Management Conference (DebtCon), the
American Society of International Law (ASIL) Dispute Resolution Interest Group Workshop,
the ASIL International Law in Domestic Courts Interest Group Workshop, the Workshop on
Formal and Informal Governance at Yale Law School, and faculty workshops at Berkeley
Law School, Cardozo Law School, Notre Dame Law School, Scalia Law School, Stanford Law
School, the University of South Carolina Law School, and the University of Houston Law
Center. I am immensely grateful to the people who work in and around sovereign debt
investing and related areas of law practice and generously agreed to speak with me.
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seek to recast the broader political and ethical dimensions of disputes by
highlighting corruption by the debtor state government. The sovereign
debt market thus relies on a hybrid of legal and nonlegal enforcement.
Parties appeal to the law to determine rights, detect bad behavior, and
provide a broad normative frame. At the same time, they depend on
reputation to discourage violations. This finding has implications for the
debate among contracts scholars about the extent to which nonlegal
mechanisms such as reputation can support trade. Recognizing that
courts can function as information intermediaries implies that courts can
expand the range of markets that reputation can support. Under certain
conditions, courts can supplement legal remedies by transmitting accurate
and credible information about market participants’ expectations
and behavior.
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Courts as Information Intermediaries

INTRODUCTION
Contracts scholars debate the extent to which nonlegal
enforcement mechanisms can support market transactions. Dispute
resolution in the international sovereign debt market offers new
insights into this question. Because creditors can rarely collect on
judgments against foreign sovereigns, researchers studying the
international sovereign debt market largely assume that law
matters little to its functioning.1 Yet creditors sometimes spend
millions of dollars and many years suing sovereigns that default.
Investors buy distressed sovereign debt—loans and bonds on
which a sovereign has already defaulted or will imminently
default—with the apparent intention of pursuing litigation to
recover it. If law does not matter, why do they do this? This Article
argues that the seemingly toothless right to sue debtor states
supports reputational enforcement in the international sovereign
debt market.
Scholars have long recognized the sovereign debt market as
part of a vast terrain of commercial relationships governed by
nonlegal mechanisms. In the sovereign debt literature, the
dominant view is that law and courts are unimportant to sustaining
sovereign lending.2 Explanations for the successful operation of this
market focus on reputational costs, retaliation measures such as
trade sanctions, and the economic and political costs of default.3

1. See Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and
Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 651, 659–64 (2009) (describing the debate in
the economics literature over whether law, reputation, or nonlegal sanctions explain why
sovereigns repay and how the sovereign debt market can exist).
2. In recent work, Mark Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati point out that law plays a larger
role than is generally assumed in structuring the sovereign borrower-lender relationship. See
W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, The Relevance of Law to Sovereign Debt, 11 ANN. REV.
L. SOC. SCI. 395 (2015) [hereinafter Weidemaier & Gulati, The Relevance of Law]. Prior to their
work, law was viewed as relevant only to the extent that it enables creditors to impose costs
on sovereigns through legal harassment. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF,
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 57 (2009); Andrei Shleifer, Will
the Sovereign Debt Markets Survive?, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 87 (2003) (“[L]enders have no
power. . . . [T]here are no courts with authority over sovereign states whose mandate is to
protect the interest of creditors.”).
3. See Panizza et al., supra note 1; Weidemaier & Gulati, The Relevance of Law, supra
note 2. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff are the most prominent proponents of the
argument that trade sanctions are a major force in incentivizing sovereigns to repay loans.
See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 57. Michael Tomz, on the other hand, finds little
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Some recent scholarship ascribes a more important role to law but
only because, in particular, unusual recent cases, courts have
implemented effective sanctions on sovereign debtors.4 Scholars of
and practitioners in the sovereign debt market widely share the
assumption that law and courts matter only to the extent that they
enable confiscation of assets.5 Although courts offer creditors a
better prospect of sanctioning debtors today than they did in
the past, scholars, market participants, and lawyers who highlight
the growing role of formal sanctions acknowledge that they
remain weak. 6

evidence of retaliatory trade sanctions against defaulting countries. See MICHAEL TOMZ,
REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 158–95 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 1, at 655–59 (surveying creditors’ enforcement efforts
and concluding that legal enforceability of sovereign debt remains minimal); W. Mark C.
Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 31 YALE J. REG. 189, 206–
08 (2014) (describing the enforcement mechanism as a “court-imposed embargo” that
hinders the ability of a sovereign to transact with third parties for fear of asset confiscation).
5. See Panizza et al., supra note 1, at 659 (“[T]he main difference between corporate
and sovereign debt is the lack of a straightforward legal mechanism to enforce repayment of
the latter. In the event of default, legal penalties or remedies do exist, but they are much more
limited than at the corporate level. This leads to the question of why debt nonetheless tends
to be repaid, and why a sovereign debt market can exist.”); REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note
2, at 53–58 (calling the lack of an effective legal enforcement mechanism against sovereigns
“the most fundamental ‘imperfection’ of international capital markets” and describing
alternative incentive devices: institutional mechanisms, defined as the threat of asset seizures
abroad, and reputational mechanisms, defined as the threat of lost future access to credit).
Reinhart and Rogoff equate reputational theories with the view that institutions, including
courts, do not matter. See id. at 55–56. While Reinhart and Rogoff argue that the threat of
asset seizures incentivizes debt repayment by posing a blockade risk to the country’s foreign
trade, they acknowledge the insufficiency of this mechanism to explain “the scale and size
of international lending or the diversity of measures creditors bring to bear in real-life default
situations.” Id. at 57.
6. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign
Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155, 157 (1989) (“[L]enders may hold the stick of being able to impose
sanctions that will impede trade and financial market transactions. However, . . . the
vulnerable assets held abroad by most LDCs are trivial relative to the amounts they owe.”);
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017) (describing how Argentina’s
creditors pursued it around the world for over a decade and had some of the world’s most
sophisticated lawyers yet recovered very little through court enforcement, that trust
structures are used to structure new debt issuances to avoid vulnerability to attachment, and
that major commodity-exporting countries like Venezuela are more vulnerable to formal
enforcement); Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Professional (July 22, 2017) (stating that
confiscating assets of a commodity exporting state like Venezuela is very difficult because
most of the assets are owned not by the state but by a corporation that is a separate
legal person).
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Professionals I interviewed who have decades of experience in
the sovereign debt market struggled to reconcile their conviction
that the law and courts are weak and unimportant in this market
with the fact that investors do indeed sue and do so aggressively at
great expense. For example, one person who has worked in the
secondary market of sovereign debt for decades emphasized the
weakness of courts. He explained that in enforcement litigation, “no
one was very successful[; i]t wasn’t the solution[,]” and discovery
efforts were “a hill of beans in the end” because they did not lead
to successful asset seizures.7 He then averred that the “threat of
litigation does move mountains” and concluded, “I don’t want to
leave off with litigation is worthless, useless. I think it does keep
people honest.”8 A senior lawyer who has defended sovereigns in
litigation described the legal situation starkly: “[T]he people who
buy these bonds better realize they are essentially unenforceable
and based on the good will of the countries. Essentially, they are
unenforceable. It’s voluntary enforcement by the debtor.”9 These
remarks seem paradoxical: how can the threat of litigation “keep
people honest” when experience demonstrates that states can so
effectively elude creditors?10
If much of the sovereign debt literature and many sovereign
debt market participants are skeptical of courts’ effectiveness, then
much of the scholarship on informal contract enforcement could be
described as hostile toward courts. Informal governance is, after all,
about “opting out of the legal system.”11 The literature highlights
the weaknesses of courts: their inability to provide adequate
remedies, their tendency to apply disfavored rules and interpretive
methods, their lack of commercial expertise, and their costliness.12

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017).
Id.
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer VI (Aug. 22, 2017).
See Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017).
See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). In more recent work, Professor Bernstein
has explored how formal contracting can “create a space in which private order can flourish.”
Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 561 (2015).
12. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1820 n.167 (1996); Bernstein,
Opting Out, supra note 11; David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
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In this literature, adjudication usually takes the form of private
arbitration, in which privately created rules are applied to decide
disputes between repeat players operating in closed networks.13
When courts are discussed, it is usually to explain how they
undermine private ordering.14 In short, neither the literature on informal contract governance nor the scholarship on sovereign
debt has much explored how courts might support informal
contract enforcement.15
This Article examines just that question. In light of the
voluminous scholarship portraying courts and informal enforcement as alternatives, the choice by participants in the sovereign
debt market to opt in to courts appears somewhat mysterious.
Certain facts deepen the mystery. There are already robust
HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990) (treating “Third-Party Decisionmaking with Reputational Enforcement” as coextensive with opting out of courts; cataloguing reasons courts are unsuitable
adjudicators for commercial transactions); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private
Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Bernstein,
Merchant Law, supra note 12; Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 11.
14. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 12, at 1820 n.167; Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva
Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of
Innovation, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 981, 998 (recounting interview respondents’ intentions to avoid
litigation at almost any cost, despite their intensive use of formal contracts to coordinate
“innovation-oriented” relationships); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 541–619 (2003) (viewing informal and
formal contract governance as alternatives); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (2003) (“[L]egal liability . . . may . . .
‘crowd out’ . . . self-enforcing mechanisms.”).
15. There are two recent exceptions. A study published in 2016 by Gillian Hadfield
and Iva Bozovic considers the role of formal contract institutions in informal enforcement,
but courts are not a focus of their study. See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 14, at 1011–12.
They find that parties in “innovation-oriented” commercial relationships make intensive use
of formal contracts but rely on informal enforcement, primarily through the threat of
terminating an ongoing relationship. See id. Gilson, Sabel, and Scott examine how formal
enforcement with mild sanctions might complement informal enforcement. Ronald J. Gilson,
Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting
in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010). However, courts can sanction
violations of some of the obligations in their study. See id. In the case of sovereign debt
contracts, none of the obligations can reliably be enforced with traditional remedies, though
all can be adjudicated. See id. Sovereign bond contracts do not look like the highly relational
contracts for innovation studied by Hadfield and Bozovic and Gilson, Sabel, and Scott.
Similarly, Edward B. Rock has theorized reputation as a key mechanism by which the courts
of Delaware discourage bad behavior by corporate executives, but his study focuses on the
law of fiduciaries and corporate governance rather than contract disputes. See Edward B.
Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997).

502

001.BLANCHARD_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

497

2/17/19 7:33 PM

Courts as Information Intermediaries

institutions acting in this market to discover and disseminate
information about sovereign borrowers’ behavior, including the
International Monetary Fund (the IMF), other multilateral financial
institutions, and credit rating agencies. This Article offers a theory
of what courts do that is distinctive and valuable to contracting
parties in this market, adding to a nascent literature examining the
role of law and courts in the sovereign debt market.16
Even though courts usually cannot enforce debtor states’
obligations through conventional judicial means, they play a key
role in the sovereign debt market. Courts are important players
because they produce information that has the power to provoke
reactions by third parties that are costly for the debtor or its agents.
Creditors litigate because revealing such information through the
courts strengthens a creditor’s leverage in settlement negotiations.
Courts serve three information-providing functions. First, when
complex legal issues arise between the parties, courts determine
whether the state has breached its obligations to the creditor.17 Such
legal determinations affect third-party assessments of the state’s
riskiness as a borrower. Second, discovery and judicial fact-finding
mitigate information asymmetries about debtor behavior during
default and restructuring.18 Third, courts provide a platform in
which creditors can recast the dispute’s political and ethical
implications, offering an alternative account of their own behavior
and that of the debtor state’s government.19 Sovereign bond
enforcement thus employs a hybrid enforcement mechanism in
which formal judicial process and informal, third-party sanctions
interact to make reputational governance more effective.20
16. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, International Finance and Sovereign Debt,
in 3 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 482 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter
Weidemaier & Gulati, Sovereign Debt] (describing the ways contracts are relevant to
sovereign debt, including in offering creditors enhanced enforcement rights and making
promises that, if disappointed, would cause reputational harm); Weidemaier & Gulati, The
Relevance of Law, supra note 2.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. See infra Section III.B.
19. See infra Section III.C.
20. Law and economics scholarship often sharply distinguishes formal from informal
enforcement and legal from nonlegal enforcement. See, e.g., Bentley MacLeod, Reputations,
Relationships, and Contract Enforcement, J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 596 (2007) (“When a contract
uses formal enforcement, breach . . . gives the harmed party the right to appeal to an impartial
third party to obtain monetary damages from the breaching party. . . . Contract law is
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Part I of this Article explains the legal framework for enforcing
sovereign debt obligations, which presents an unusual separation
of courts’ adjudicatory and enforcement functions. Part II explains
how reputation operates in the sovereign debt market, analyzing
how the determinants of effective reputational governance apply in
this context. Part III discusses what courts add to reputation in this
market and presents evidence that they serve as reputational
intermediaries. The evidence includes court decisions and litigation
documents, generalist and trade media reports, and interviews
with industry participants.21 Part IV concludes with implications
for the theory of sovereign debt, informal contract governance, and
the role of courts in commercial disputes.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS
Most foreign-issued sovereign bonds contain New York forum
selection clauses. This Part describes the legal framework for such
bonds.22 Judgments against sovereign defaulters are hard to enforce
because sovereign assets are protected by immunities and because
concerned with the question of determining whether or not a breach has occurred and, if so,
what damages should be given in light of the contract that the parties have signed. In
contrast, under informal enforcement the harmed party unilaterally decides that breach has
occurred and then carries out actions that harm the reputation of the breaching party.”).
MacLeod’s synthesis of the literature highlights the unilateral element of informal
enforcement: even where collective action is required to punish cheaters, a party that
considers itself to have been harmed has the power unilaterally to invoke collective
punishment. Other scholars assume the unilateral element in informal enforcement. See
DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 36–
60 (1990); Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912 (1994).
“Formal” is often used interchangeably with “legal” and sometimes also with “public.”
Likewise, scholars often toggle between “informal,” “nonlegal,” and “private.” See ROBERT
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 127 (1991) (defining
“law” as rules enforced by governments rather than through social means); Barak D.
Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2330 (2004).
Other scholarship is more precise. See BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE 12–13
(2017); Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Law Without the State, 1 J. L. & CTS. 3 (2013).
21. Twenty interviews were conducted by telephone between May and September 2017
with professionals with substantial experience in the aspects of sovereign debt discussed
here. Further description of the interviews is in the Appendix. Records of the interviews are
on file with the author.
22. London and U.K. law are the second most common choices of forum and law for
foreign-issued sovereign debt. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF
MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 54 (2012). The
aspects of the law relevant to this analysis are substantially the same.

504

001.BLANCHARD_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

497

2/17/19 7:33 PM

Courts as Information Intermediaries

sovereigns do not keep assets where they are vulnerable to seizure.
Sovereigns have two types of immunity from the power of foreign
courts: jurisdictional and executional immunity. Jurisdictional
immunity has largely been eliminated for sovereigns when they act
in a commercial capacity, such as when they issue bonds.23
Immunity from execution against sovereign assets, however,
remains largely in place. Bonds that submit disputes to New York
courts typically waive both jurisdictional and executional immunity with respect to courts in New York.
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) permits courts to attach sovereign assets that are located in
the United States, commercial in nature, and connected to the
dispute under adjudication.24 Assets of a public nature are immune.
In a dispute concerning a sovereign bond, and in many disputes
concerning bank borrowing by foreign states, there will typically
be no assets located in the United States that are connected to the
dispute. If the contract waives immunity from execution, however,
a New York court can reach all of the sovereign’s commercial assets
that are in the United States.25
For most sovereigns, even this broader formulation leaves few
to no vulnerable assets in the United States.26 Therefore, some
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012) (providing that states benefit from no immunity from
jurisdiction if either (a) they have waived their immunity or (b) the action is based on a
commercial activity conducted in or directly affecting the United States); Republic of Arg. v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992). Outside the United States, the dominant view is that
sovereigns do not enjoy jurisdictional immunity for their commercial activities. See HAZEL
FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITIES 222 (2d ed. 2008). For an overview of the history of
sovereign immunity law as it relates to sovereign debt, see Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R.
Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT .
REV. 213, 219; Weidemaier & Gulati, The Relevance of Law, supra note 2, at 398. For recent
developments, see Lorenza Mola, Sovereign Immunity, Insolvent States and Private Bondholders:
Recent National and International Case Law, 11 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 525, 534,
536 (2012).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012).
25. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
67, 92.
26. An exception is where the sovereign is making payments on other bonds through
a fiscal agent located in New York. In that case, creditors might be able to attach payments
to other bondholders when they are in possession of the fiscal agent. It is possible to use a
trust structure to avoid this outcome. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I
(July 12, 2017). Additionally, courts have, in some cases, declined applications to order
injunctive relief that would interfere with the issuance of new debt or restructuring of
existing debt, so this enforcement mechanism is not guaranteed. The Republic of Congo, for
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bonds also submit to jurisdiction and waive immunity before all
other courts in the world, but only for actions to enforce a New
York court judgment concerning the bond. Such provisions permit
investors to pursue sovereign assets, wherever in the world they
may be. Thus, they appear on their face to offer creditors a strong
enforcement mechanism. Without global submission to jurisdiction
and waiver of executional immunity, only rarely can a court outside
New York enforce a New York court judgment. But even with such
a waiver, foreign courts exercise only limited coercive power
because waivers are construed narrowly, either by judicial interpretation or because of statutory limits on their scope. Additionally,
sovereigns avoid holding vulnerable assets in jurisdictions where
they might be seized.27
Because of all these constraints, sovereign bond judgment
creditors have had very little success enforcing judgments, even
under the broadest of waivers. Sovereign bonds have therefore long
exhibited the odd feature of offering creditors access to
adjudication but not meaningful formal enforcement.28 Early
modern bonds contained the starkest iteration of this apparent
paradox: from the late 1970s until the mid-1990s, nearly all bonds
contained waivers of jurisdictional immunity but hardly any
waived executional immunity.29 From the mid-1990s until the early
2000s, many bonds contained broad waivers of jurisdictional and
enforcement immunity that, as described above, appeared on their
instance, was able to issue new debt in London while it had an outstanding judgment there.
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Professional (July 22, 2017); see also Rossini v. Republic
of Arg., 453 F. App’x 22, 22–25 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming trial court’s denial of requests for
preliminary injunctions enjoining Argentina from issuing bonds); Capital Ventures Int’l v.
Republic of Arg., 443 F.3d 214, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing trial court’s denial of request
for an injunction on the grounds that the injunction would have interfered with a bond
exchange offer).
27. Countries that export commodities are the most vulnerable to asset seizure.
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017). Venezuela scrupulously paid
its external debt in the face of dire economic conditions because it feared seizure of its oil
assets. Id.
28. A concerted effort by states in the second half of the twentieth century sought to
formalize governance of sovereign borrowing and led to the inclusion in bond contracts of
submission to formal enforcement. However, legislatures and courts proved reticent about
taking coercive actions against foreign sovereigns. Therefore, sovereign bond contracts for
several decades contained dispute resolution provisions that allowed creditors to get into
court to litigate on the merits but offered them little prospect of recovery.
29. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 25, at 87.
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face to permit creditors to pursue enforcement in multiple
jurisdictions. There has been a rollback of submission to courts for
enforcement purposes in recent bonds: some states have eliminated
the worldwide immunity waiver from their bonds, limiting
creditors to New York courts.30
Bondholders recently achieved one major, but fleeting, enforcement success. Courts in Brussels and New York read a term—
known as the pari passu provision—in Argentine sovereign bonds
to require Argentina to pay holdout creditors whenever it paid
creditors that had accepted Argentina’s offer to restructure its
debt.31 That interpretation permitted a New York court to enjoin
Argentina from paying restructured creditors unless it also paid
holdouts. The injunction forced Argentina back into default.
However, this “ratable payments” interpretation is unlikely to hold
sway for long. The Second Circuit decision stated emphatically that
the interpretation was “an exceptional one with little apparent
bearing on transactions that can be expected in the future.”32
Moreover, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have rejected
the interpretation;33 the official sector has lobbied vigorously
against the interpretation;34 only a minority of outstanding bonds

30. Compare Republic of Argentina, Prospectus, Registration No. 333-216627, at xi–xii
(Mar. 14, 2017), with the text of the bonds at issue in the litigation concerning Argentina’s
2001 default. The immunity waiver from the earlier bonds is quoted in published opinions
from the litigation. See, e.g., NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Arg. [2011] UKSC 31, [58]–[60]
(on appeal from [2010] EWCA (Civ) 41).
31. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in
Commercial Boilerplate 16–40 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-40, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2835681. A Belgian court had issued a similar ruling against Peru in 1999. See
Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Brussel, Sept. 26, 2000, AR No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.).
32. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. 2013). The
court continued,
Our decision here does not control the interpretation of all pari passu clauses or the
obligations of other sovereign debtors under pari passu clauses in other debt
instruments. As we explicitly stated in our last opinion, we have not held that a
sovereign debtor breaches its pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and
not another, or even every time it enacts a law disparately affecting a creditor’s rights.
Id.
33. See FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND
LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 70–71 (2006).
34. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 31, at 17.
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contain the language on which the interpretation was based;35 and
recent bonds have been drafted to defang pari passu provisions.36
The difficulty of enforcing judgments would not have been a
surprise to bond purchasers. Sophisticated banks and investment firms, which have largely dominated this market, factor the
legal framework into their risk models.37 Prospectuses of bonds
issued in New York include disclosures about the bonds’ limited enforceability.38
Successfully suing a sovereign debtor, therefore, offers little
prospect of recovery through conventional means. This is
especially true of pre-1990 bonds and recent bonds that submit only
to the courts of New York. Even if the sovereign has substantial
commercial assets in the United States, it can remove vulnerable
assets from U.S. territory in anticipation of default or litigation,
structure its holding of commercial assets so that they are not
considered sovereign assets, and structure new debt issuances to
make it impossible for judgment creditors to attach their proceeds.39

35. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 22.
36. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 31, at 30 (finding that as of the second quarter

of 2016, bonds comprising nearly seventy percent of dollar value of offerings during that
quarter had revised the pari passu language to avoid the ratable payments interpretation).
37. Institutional investors model the legal terms of bonds when calculating their
riskiness. Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017). Legal terms are present in the
bonds of risky but not those of riskless sovereigns, and the terms change in response to
political risk shocks. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of
Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 131 (2012). Sovereign
immunity and dispute resolution provisions, in particular, vary across issuers and over time
for individual issuers and, unlike the pari passu provisions, display differences and changes
that clearly alter the parties’ legal rights. Compare, for example, Argentina’s bonds from the
1990s to its more recent bonds. See also id.; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82
TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2009); Weidemaier & Gulati, The Relevance of Law, supra note 2, at 397–400.
See generally Weidemaier & Gulati, Sovereign Debt, supra note 16.
38. See, e.g., Offering Circular, The Republic of Ecuador, U.S. $1,000,000,000, 10.750%
Notes Due 2022, at 25–26 (July 28, 2016); United Mexican States, Pre-effective Amendment
No. 3 to Registration Statement Under Schedule B of the Securities Act of 1933, Registration
No. 333-167916, at S-9 (Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368
/000119312510203668/dsba.htm#toc.
39. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
628 (1983) (establishing a “presumption that a foreign government’s determination that its
instrumentality is to be accorded separate legal status” will be respected); Walters v. Indus.
& Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 298 (2d Cir. 2011) (establishing a
presumption that assets of a state-owned company cannot be used to satisfy a judgment
against the state). But see Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2003)
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To be sure, avoiding holding assets in or routing them through
the United States is not costless. A creditor facing an outstanding
judgment in New York might not be able to issue securities on the
New York Stock Exchange because proceeds might be subject to
enforcement, though New York courts have declined to grant
creditor requests that would prevent new debt issuance.40 Transactions must be structured so as to avoid placing commercial
property owned by the sovereign within the United States.41
However, the experience of the creditors that held out against
Argentina demonstrates the low prospects of achieving satisfaction
of a judgment against a sovereign debtor in the United States. U.S.
law is strongly protective of foreign sovereign assets.42 Unlike the
laws of many European countries, the FSIA irrevocably shields
assets of a public nature. Under the FSIA, even a broad immunity
waiver only applies to commercial assets.43
A sovereign that submits to enforcement in all jurisdictions
faces higher litigation-related costs. In addition to legal expenses to
avoid creditors, it might have to remove assets from many
jurisdictions that offer commercial and investment opportunities. It
might also face higher costs of engaging in international
transactions and collecting taxes from entities located abroad.
However, attachment of sovereign assets by bond creditors is
vanishingly rare. Creditors can use court orders to throw sand in
the gears of a defaulting country’s trade and finance. But

(holding that a directly state-owned enterprise can be held to be the state’s alter-ego where
failing to do so would allow “fraud or injustice”).
40. See Rossini v. Republic of Arg., 453 F. App’x 22, 22–25 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming trial
court’s denial of requests for preliminary injunctions enjoining Argentina from issuing
bonds); Capital Ventures Int’l v. Republic of Arg., 443 F.3d 214, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2006)
(discussing trial court’s denial of request for an injunction on the grounds that the injunction
would have interfered with a bond exchange offer).
41. See Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 6, at 158–59. A specialized legal practice has arisen
to advise sovereigns and third parties contracting with them on how to structure transactions
to avoid having payments subject to enforcement litigation. See Kenneth Reisenfeld, Mark
Cymrot & Joshua Robbins, Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: Mixed Bag for Energy Cos., LAW360
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/881735/suits-against-foreign-sovereigns
-mixed-bag-for-energy-cos.
42. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1078, 1086 (2004) (cataloguing the failures of
judgment creditors’ attempts to collect against sovereign bond defaulters in the United States).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012).
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experience shows that courts are loath to do so and are often
circumvented when they do.44 Scholars who have written about
litigation emphasize these costs.45 However, in practice, even when
bondholders are empowered to pursue enforcement worldwide,
they rarely succeed in attaching sovereign assets.46 This observed
fact demonstrates the weakness of the threat of attachment.
Sometimes the debt is so small that early settlement is preferable to
the expense of extended litigation.47 However, on other occasions,
the amounts at stake are orders of magnitude greater than either
the legal costs that can be imposed on a debtor through litigation or
the stock of assets vulnerable to seizure.48 Conventional remedies
and litigation-related costs therefore are not powerful enough to
entirely explain why creditors sue and why investors lend. A key
role of courts in this domain is as information intermediaries that
strengthen reputational enforcement.

44. See supra notes 26–27. A bill introduced in Congress in 2011 that sought to bar
foreign states facing sizeable U.S. court judgments from issuing new debt on U.S. markets
was unsuccessful. Creditors have in some cases interfered with new debt issuances. See supra
notes 31–32 and accompanying text. Sovereigns whose economies rest heavily on international trade in commodities are the most vulnerable but can elude creditors by trading
through separate corporate entities or concealing their ownership of assets through straw
companies. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Professional (July 22, 2017); Interview with
Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017).
45. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 56–57.
46. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default,
5 ANN. REV. ECON. 247, 262 (2013). In the more than ten years of litigation against Argentina
before the pari passu ruling and related injunction, its holdout creditors pursued it in courts
around the world with very little success in attaching assets.
47. Media reports indicate that the litigating creditors recovered less than $200 million
through formal enforcement, under four percent of the $4.6 billion for which these creditors
ultimately settled with Argentina. See Hilary Burke, Funds to Seize Argentina Assets Held in
U.S., REUTERS (July 20, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/argentina-debt-funds/funds
-to-seize-argentine-assets-held-in-u-s-idUSL2E8IK8U920120720; Caught Napping, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 13, 2012), https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2012/10/13/caught-napping;
Michael D. Goldhaber, An Infamous Bet, AM. LAW. 48, 50 (Oct. 2016), http://www.american
lawyer-digital.com/americanlawyer-ipauth/201610flaip?pg=48#pg48; Julie Wernau & Taos
Turner, Argentina Debt Deal Poised to Deliver Big Payday to Holdouts, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 29,
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-holdout-creditors-agree-to-4-65-billion-settle
ment-1456760652.
48. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 194; Interview with Senior Sovereign
Debt Lawyer II (July 19, 2017) (discussing a case he worked on in which the debtor state had
almost no assets outside its territory but was concerned about litigation).
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II. REPUTATION IN THE SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKET
The extent to which a market relies on informal versus formal
enforcement depends on the relative costs of each for incentivizing
optimal compliance with contracts. The effectiveness of reputation
and the mechanism by which it operates depend largely on two
dimensions of information costs: the cost of producing credible and
relevant information about traders, and the cost of transmitting that
information to prospective counterparties. Information costs, together with the value of lost future transactions, determine the cost
of cheating.
The sovereign debt market exhibits some features that make it
amenable to reputational governance and others that hinder
reputation from operating effectively. The reputation-supporting
features are substantial. Sovereign borrowers are about as far from
anonymous as a commercial entity can be and are subject to
significant scrutiny by the press and other information-reporting
institutions. These characteristics lower the costs of disseminating
information about default behavior, not only to bond market
participants but also to actors in other fields in which sovereigns
operate. In addition, sovereigns have a long time horizon49 and few
alternative opportunities that are shielded from the effects of
reputation in the sovereign debt market. These factors increase the
cost of compromising future transactions by incurring reputational
damage. Against the characteristics tending toward effective reputational enforcement, high monitoring and verification costs pose
the greatest barrier to effective reputational governance.
A. Information Dissemination Costs
Reputation’s effectiveness increases as information about past
behavior spreads more widely among potential counterparties.50
49. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the time horizons
of sovereigns and the time horizons of governments.
50. This is a key lesson from the literature on informal governance. Much of the value
of closed and quasi-closed networks is the inability to escape one’s past. See Lisa Bernstein,
Contract Governance in Small World Networks: The Case of the Maghribi Traders, NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Bernstein, The Case of the Maghribi Traders]; Bernstein, Opting
Out, supra note 11; Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the
Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981).

511

001.BLANCHARD_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/17/19 7:33 PM

2018

Contemporary sovereign debt defaults are highly visible events.
They are front-page news, not only in industry trade publications
but also in mainstream newspapers. Today, most sovereign debt
takes the form of bonds. Unlike in the past, when most sovereign
debt consisted of syndicated loans from a small number of highly
sophisticated banks, modern bonds are often held by dispersed
creditors or by institutions that manage the assets of masses of
investors, which draws public attention to default events.
Defaults often occur during times of economic crisis, when
scrutiny of the defaulting sovereign is high. Credit rating agencies
and the IMF report on sovereign borrowers’ behavior during
restructuring negotiations,51 and both regulation and custom
dictate that sovereigns include information about previous
defaults in their prospectuses. 52
Sovereign defaults thus result in the widespread dissemination
of information about the facts of a default, the time spent in default,
levels of creditor recovery, and treatment of creditors during
default and restructuring.
B. The Value of Lost Future Transactions
The threat of a tarnished reputation is only as strong as the
value of the future transactions it jeopardizes. The value of lost
future trade depends, to a large extent, on how widely word
spreads about bad behavior, and as discussed above,53 sovereign
defaults are no secret. Further, sovereigns face an effectively
infinite time horizon and costly reputation spillovers beyond the

51. See, e.g., IMF, Dominica: Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criterion, Country
Report No. 04/286, at 11–12 (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter IMF, Country Report No. 04/286] (“The
authorities have followed best practices in implementing the debt restructuring exercise (i.e.,
transparency, creditor consultations, and inter-creditor equity). They approached creditors
at an early stage, while continuing to service fully their obligations under the program . . . .”);
cf. Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing, 4
ECON. & POL. 117 (1992).
52. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina, Prospectus (Mar. 14, 2017), supra note 30. SEC rules
require the disclosure of this information for debt issuances to retail investors, but even
prospectuses for issues to Qualified Institutional Buyers, which are exempt from those
disclosures, often include them.
53. See supra Section II.A.
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bond market. Together, these factors tend to raise the stakes of
incurring reputational damage.
Most theories of sovereign borrower reputation assume perfect
information and a unitary state with an infinite time horizon.54
While sovereigns have an effectively infinite time horizon,
governments do not. Governments of democracies that default on
debt might be punished politically because of the economic damage
resulting from default.55 Some governments, therefore, have
incentives to behave like actors with long time horizons. On
occasion, however, governments that default are rewarded
politically.56 Theories of sovereign borrower reputation with more
realistic assumptions and stronger predictive power account for a
non-unitary state, changing government, learning by investors, and
different reputational consequences resulting from opportunistic as
compared to non-opportunistic default.
Michael Tomz’s reputational theory of the sovereign debt
market accounts for investors’ limited information and their ability
to learn about sovereigns’ political preferences by observing
political change and behavior. Tomz offers strong empirical
support for this theory.57 He shows that investors consider not only
whether a sovereign has defaulted but also why it has defaulted.
Recognizing that creditors care about the reasons for default is key
to understanding the role of courts in sovereign debt disputes.
Creditors have incomplete information and the capacity to
learn about governments’ changeable preferences. Reputations
consist of types, and Tomz identifies creditors’ classifications of
54. See TOMZ, supra note 3, at 10–13. Tomz describes standard reputational theories
that assume that borrowers have complete information about sovereign lenders’ preferences
and that those preferences are static. Such assumptions necessarily rest on the assumptions
that the sovereign is a unitary entity with a single set of preferences rather than a complex
organization with leadership that changes over time.
55. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text; Kenneth A. Schultz & Barry R.
Weingast, The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International
Competition, 57 INT’L ORG., Winter 2003, at 3, 5, 13–14.
56. Rafael Correa campaigned for Ecuador’s presidency on a debt repudiation
platform, won, defaulted, and was reelected despite the economic harm the default caused
to the country. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, When Bad Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt
Contracts: The Case of Ecuador, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251 (2010). Similarly, Argentina’s
Kirchner government used its stance against so-called vulture creditors as a key component
of its populist appeal for over ten years.
57. See TOMZ, supra note 3, at 9–14.
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sovereign borrowers as lemons that always default, fair-weathers that
default when times are bad, or stalwarts that always repay.58
Investors learn about types by observing countries’ decisions
whether to repay in light of prevailing economic circumstances.59
They update their beliefs in response to new information.60 Grossman
and Van Huyck similarly model investors as “differentiat[ing]
excusable defaults, which are associated with implicitly understood
contingencies, from unjustifiable repudiation.”61
Under Tomz’s theory, a country’s reputation changes when it
acts contrary to its perceived type, which usually reflects political
change.62 Investors’ beliefs about states’ preferences regarding
repayment affect their willingness to lend and the yield they
demand.63 Past behavior affects future investment decisions
because of what it reveals about likely future behavior.
The sovereign bond market is unlike the archetypal reputationgoverned market described in the literature on informal
contracting.64 It is not a small, close-knit community, or even a
closed network. Its size and openness would seem to make
coordinating collective retaliation more costly and undermine
efforts to ostracize cheaters. Neither Tomz’s nor Grossman and Van
Huyck’s models involve investor retaliation or collusion.
Governments know how investors view reputation and decide
whether to default or repay based on the costs of each.65 Empirical
studies have found evidence suggesting that sovereign bond
investors do not retaliate against past defaulters.66 Instead, the
evidence points to defaulters paying a risk premium, but not

58. Id. at 17, 23. One-third of sovereign defaults occur during good times. Michael
Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, Do Countries Default in “Bad Times”?, 5 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 352,
355 (2007).
59. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 17.
60. Id. at 18.
61. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim:
Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1088, 1097 (1988).
62. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 18–19.
63. Id. at 23–25.
64. See supra notes 11–14, 20, 50 and accompanying text. See also JANET TAI LANDA ,
ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF CHINESE MERCHANTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: IDENTITY, ETHNIC
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT (2016); Bernstein, The Case of the Maghribi Traders, supra note 50.
65. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 25–27; Grossman & Van Huyck, supra note 61 at 1090–95.
66. See TOMZ, supra note 3, at 5–6.

514

001.BLANCHARD_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

497

2/17/19 7:33 PM

Courts as Information Intermediaries

punitive, excess returns.67 While default has been found to block
market access for a period, there is no indication that the barriers
to access involve collective action rather than resulting from
uncoordinated market forces. That is, when defaulters lose
market access, it is because investors are unwilling to offer credit
at a rate acceptable to the sovereign because of the latter’s
extreme riskiness.68
Ostracism is not necessary to effectively sanction a breacher as
long as credible reputational information is widely available to
market participants and future transactions are more valuable than
the gain from cheating now. Prominent examples of reputational
governance described in the informal contracting literature that
seem to hinge on ostracism look different on closer examination.
Avner Greif, for instance, describes the Maghribi traders as
ostracizing suspected norm violators.69 However, even without
ostracism, a trader’s bad reputation, if spread widely enough,
would impose costs by reducing his pool of counterparties and
permitting them to demand a risk premium. The key to the
Maghribis’ effective reputational enforcement is that it was
common knowledge that news of bad behavior would be widely
disseminated. Bernstein shows in a new study of the Maghribis that
a great deal of the value of their network lay in the provision of
information and the ability to verify it by triangulation using
several sources.70 Her findings suggest that ostracism played a
smaller role in governance than has been assumed. Instead, letters
were filled with detailed information about events at various trade
nodes, including verifiable facts at a granular level, such as market
prices on certain dates and when ships arrived and departed from
port. What closed-network governance offers of most significance
is not the prospect of collective shunning but the inescapability of
past behavior. The lower the proportion of prospective counterparties a cheater expects will learn of his behavior, the less likely he
67. Tomz & Wright, supra note 58.
68. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 196–219.
69. Greif, supra note 50. Some historians have argued that the evidence does not

support the claim that the Maghribis practiced ostracism. Jeremy Edwards &
Sheilagh Ogilvie, Contract Enforcement, Institutions, and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders
Reappraised, 65 ECON. HIST. REV. 421, 441–42 (2012).
70. See Bernstein, The Case of the Maghribi Traders, supra note 50.
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is to expect sanctions, and the more likely he is to cheat. The
technologies that disseminate knowledge of sovereign debtors’
behavior assure all parties in the sovereign debt market that
nonpayment and information about the reasons for nonpayment
will be publicized. 71
Spillover effects in other social fields raise the cost of cheating.
For the governments that make decisions about whether to repay
creditors, spillover effects threaten three key fields beyond the
sovereign debt market: foreign direct investment and international
trade, international relations, and domestic politics. Various
aspects of reputation operate with differing force, and sometimes
push in different directions, in each of these fields. Earning a
reputation for opportunism or promise breaking through a dispute
with foreign bondholders hurts reputation most in the bond market
and foreign direct investment, but it might worsen or improve a
government’s reputation in the short run in domestic politics and
with some other states. Defaulting on foreign-issued debt
discourages foreign direct investment—which dollar-for-dollar is
more beneficial to a country than debt—because foreigners worry
about having their assets seized or being otherwise devalued by
state action.72 Defaulting might hurt the country’s international
trade by making short-term trade credit unavailable because of
heightened political risk.73
A defaulting state faces the prospect of sanctions in its relations
with other sovereigns and multilateral financial institutions. Unlike
in the private sector, reputational governance in the official sector
is partly driven by concerted action. States have faced, for instance,
threats of loan and aid denials from the multilateral development
and lending institutions, as well as suspension of trade benefits, for

71. See id.
72. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 31, 58 (describing how defaulting reduces

foreign direct investment); Interview with Senior Sovereign Transaction Lawyer (Aug. 14,
2017) (“A lot of investment, particularly infrastructure investment, requires lending. You
have to get lenders to lend to the country. Lenders are generally uncomfortable lending into
a defaulted sovereign, one that has a reputation for interfering or not honoring loans.
Default . . . [also often] prevents payments by private sector borrowers because [it] affects
foreign exchange. . . . [Y]ou’re reluctant to finance to or in that country.”).
73. Interview with Senior Sovereign Transaction Lawyer (Aug. 14, 2017).
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refusing to pay arbitration awards.74 Opportunism in relations with
foreign creditors tends to harm reputation with states that value the
rule of law and with the multilateral financial institutions, such as
the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development
Bank, whose decision-making is powerfully influenced, if not
controlled, by those states.
However, other factors tend against public-sector sanctioning
of sovereign debtors that default. Aggressive creditors also face
reputational risk with the same public-sector actors listed above
because public-sector actors value global financial stability, poverty
alleviation, and their reputations for promoting those goals.
International public-sector actors sometimes judge the legal rights
of particular creditors to be at odds with these other values.
Moreover, non-Western states now control a large proportion of
global capital and might offer alternative potential funding sources.
Those states’ willingness, in order to advance political goals, to
provide funds in spite of a country’s poor reputation for repayment
eases reputational pressure on states that, in the past, would have
faced ostracism in international public-sector lending.75
Further, a sovereign that earns a reputation for promise
breaking and law defiance risks incurring a fundamental reputation problem across social fields that is more difficult to
ameliorate than a reputation for economic mismanagement.
Whereas the latter can be offset, to some extent, by committing to
implement different policies, the former undermines a sovereign’s,
and a government’s, very power to promise. A reputation for
promise breaking can hardly be mitigated through additional
promises.76 Therefore, sovereigns should be protective of their
reputation for keeping promises.
Finally, given the heterogeneity of preferences of actors in the
three social fields described above, creditors can strengthen the
reputational threat to recalcitrant governments by uncovering or
74. See Charles N. Brower, Sadie Blanchard & Charles B. Rosenberg, International
Development Loans and Non-compliance with Investment Arbitration Awards, in A REVOLUTION
IN THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE, JR. 529 (Borzu
Sabahi et al. eds., 2014).
75. Interview with Senior Sovereign Transaction Lawyer (Aug. 14, 2017).
76. See Weidemaier & Gulati, Sovereign Debt, supra note 16, at 486–87; Rachel Brewster,
Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231 (2009).
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highlighting behavior by the government that is viewed negatively
by third parties with power to sanction the state, even if that
behavior is not part of the core dispute.77 This ability of creditors to
leverage information tangential to the central legal dispute, but
central to the concerns of other potential transactors with the
sovereign, expands the scope of reputational enforcement to cover
cases in which agents of the state would not be punished, and might
even be rewarded, for violating debt obligations.
C. Monitoring and Verification Costs
However effectively reputation channels broadcast information
that threatens to jeopardize breachers’ future transactions, information dissemination cannot support trade if the information is not
sufficiently trusted or if signals are excessively noisy. Hurdles to
trust in information regarding sovereign bond defaults include
high monitoring and verification costs and heterogeneous preferences among market participants.
The kind of information that is relevant to sovereign reputation
depends on what the relevant audiences care about. As explained
above,78 creditors consider not only whether a sovereign has
defaulted but also why it has defaulted. They distinguish defaults
they deem justifiable from unjustifiable debt repudiation.79
Investors therefore care about aspects of default about which the
truth is not easily ascertained, such as whether the default was
opportunistic or necessary. They also care about whether default
was caused by external shocks or economic mismanagement80 and
about how the state treats creditors in the event of default. As a
senior sovereign debt lawyer explained,

77. Cf. TOMZ, supra note 3, at 7–9 (discussing the related concept of “issue linkage”).
78. See supra notes 55–68 and accompanying text.
79. See TOMZ, supra note 3, at 17, 23; Grossman & Van Huyck, supra note 61. One-third

of sovereign defaults occur during good times. Tomz & Wright, supra note 58, at 355.
80. See ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT 57–99 (2014) (describing
investors’ willingness to lend to even recently defaulting states when they judge the default
to have been justified). Interviewees also explained that market participants care about the
reason for a default and how it was handled. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I
(July 12, 2017); Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017). Reinhart and Rogoff argue
that “willingness to pay rather than ability to pay is typically the main determinant of
country default.” REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 54.
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What the market remembers more than the fact of a debt
restructuring is the professionalism with which it’s done. If you
do it like Argentina, where the politicians are able to make a huge
political, populist point about fighting the vultures and so forth,
the market remembers that. Uruguay restructured in 2003; did it
very maturely. The market rewarded it, and Uruguay was able to
do a wholly voluntary issuance.81

Much of the sovereign’s decision-making that affects its ability
to repay, its decision whether to repay, and how to restructure
cannot be perfectly monitored because of high exogenous risk and
the complexity of the economic, financial, and political factors that
affect ability to pay.82 Creditors cannot perfectly monitor the value
of the resources available for payment, so it is difficult to discern
whether a restructuring offer is a good deal or a bad one.
Some interview subjects remarked that the market has a short
memory. They therefore questioned how strong of a threat
reputation poses.83 Statistical evidence, however, shows that
sovereigns that are expected to default pay more on average for
capital, that sovereigns that default in defiance of market
expectations faced increased borrowing costs, and that sovereigns
that establish a record of diligent repayment reduce their
borrowing costs.84 Further, reputation during default should be
considered separately from reputation at the time of future debt
offerings. Even if the market were quick to forgive a defaulter once
it has settled with creditors, a belief by holdout creditors that the
state is dealing unfairly and understating its ability to pay
lengthens the time in default. This, in turn, increases the harm to
the country from defaulting. As long as a sovereign remains in

81. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017).
82. Cf. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, Reputation Effects and the Limits of

Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry, 115 Q.J. ECON. 989 (2000) (finding that
Indian software firms develop a reputation for remediation, which they can control, rather
than quality alone because quality is poorly correlated with performance); MacLeod, supra
note 20 (showing that warranty contracts lower the cost of informal enforcement as
compared to standard sales contracts because of imperfect correlation between performance
and quality).
83. Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017).
84. TOMZ, supra note 3.
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default,85 its credit ratings remain low, further sovereign borrowing
is expensive or impossible, and nongovernmental sectors are
negatively affected.86 Even if investors’ memories are short once
a default is cured, reputation can deter cheating when information is disseminated widely if present reputation, by preventing
a state from curing default, causes sufficient harm during the
period of default.
The rest of this Part describes the information provided about
sovereign borrowers by two key information intermediaries operating in the sovereign debt market: multilateral official lending
institutions and credit rating agencies. It also explains why
investors view those institutions as having limited reliability as
reputation verifiers.
1. Multilateral official lending institutions
Public-sector multilateral lending institutions, such as the IMF
and the Inter-American Development Bank, monitor and report on
the behavior of sovereigns, including sovereign borrowers.87 The
information they provide probes deeply into the core issues of
willingness versus ability to pay, the competence of economic
management, and the impact on a debtor country of exogenous
shocks. The IMF monitors and disseminates information relevant
to sovereign behavior under two ongoing monitoring programs
and engages in more intensive monitoring of countries that borrow
from the IMF. The first program, Article IV bilateral surveillance, is
continuous monitoring of and annual reporting on all member
countries, which assesses economic and financial policies that affect
the country’s stability, including exchange rate; monetary, fiscal,
and financial sector; and structural policies.88 Bilateral surveillance
also includes assessments of “inward spillovers,” or global
85. Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt
Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 40 (Int’l Monetary Fund
Working Paper WP/12/203, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012
/wp12203.pdf.
86. Id. at 40, 62.
87. See Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus
Corporate Debt, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 990–97 (2007).
88. See IMF, Guidance Note for Surveillance Under Article IV Consultation 8–9 (May 2015),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/031915.pdf.
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economic factors that affect financial stability.89 The second
program is the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Program.
Member countries that voluntarily subscribe to this program
commit to providing economic and financial data to the IMF for
public dissemination on a regular basis.90 If a member stops
sending data or if the IMF is concerned about the information’s
veracity, the member becomes subject to escalating censures. Early
censures are not made public, but the IMF eventually announces a
country’s continued refusal to cooperate.91
In addition to bilateral surveillance, the IMF intensively
monitors and reports on countries under IMF reform and
adjustment programs. Countries that borrow under certain IMF
instruments must agree to intensive monitoring and reporting.
Low-income countries may also choose to be intensively monitored
and reported on without borrowing.92 A stated purpose of the
IMF’s discretionary monitoring programs is to enable countries to
signal commitment to stabilizing economic policies.93 Some
sovereign debt contracts have required the borrower to remain a
member in good standing of the IMF,94 and in some cases countries
have borrowed small amounts from the IMF specifically to show
prospective creditors that they were willingly subjecting themselves to heightened IMF monitoring.95

89. Id. at 9.
90. See IMF Standards for Data Dissemination, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 8, 2018),

https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/45/Standards-for
-Data-Dissemination.
91. Interview with IMF Staffer (July 18, 2017).
92. The IMF’s Policy Support instrument (PSI) and Staff-Monitored Programs allow
intensive monitoring without borrowing. See Policy Support Instrument (PSI), INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02
/21/21/Policy-Support-Instrument; Interview with IMF Staffer (July 18, 2017).
93. See Policy Support Instrument (PSI), supra note 92. Staff-Monitored Programs are
informal agreements between the country and the IMF to monitor execution of a predetermined economic reform program. See IMF Management Completes the Second Review Under the
Staff-Monitored Program for Somalia and IMF Managing Director Approves a New Staff-Monitored
Program, INT’L MONETARY FUND n.1 (July 12, 2017), https://imf-fmi.africa-newsroom.com
/press/imf-management-completes-the-second-review-under-the-staffmonitored-program-for
-somalia-and-imf-managing-director-approves-a-new-staffmonitored-program?lang=en; Interview with IMF Staffer (July 18, 2017).
94. Gulati & Triantis, supra note 87, at 998.
95. Id. at 999.
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When countries subject to intensive monitoring have defaulted,
or are known to be at risk of default, the IMF’s published reports
might assess the sovereign’s economic management, its resources
available to pay creditors, and whether restructuring negotiations
are following conventional best practices. Such IMF reports
provide reasoned opinions about the causes of default or
threatened default and details about the timing and terms of any
restructuring offers and creditors’ responses.96 While publication of
surveillance reports of a member country is subject to its consent,
there is a presumption of publication under all monitoring programs
except bilateral surveillance. Under bilateral surveillance, the IMF
publishes a press release upon completion of each report. Therefore, under all of the IMF’s monitoring programs, non-publication
sends a negative signal.97 IMF monitoring will thus provide at least
some information relevant to assessing the causes of default and
ability and willingness to pay.
However, market participants and observers have questioned
for some time the IMF’s capacity to serve as a delegated market
monitor.98 Moreover, creditors have reasons to anticipate that their
perspectives on a debtor state’s future behavior might differ from
the views of the multilateral institutions, or that the multilateral
institutions might, themselves, have reputational weaknesses that

96. See, e.g., IMF, Country Report No. 04/286, supra note 51.
The authorities have followed best practices in implementing the debt
restructuring exercise (i.e., transparency, creditor consultations, and inter-creditor
equity). They approached creditors at an early stage, while continuing to service
fully their obligations under the program . . . .
....
The debt restructuring process is lagging behind. The authorities announced
a debt exchange offer on April 6, which includes a menu of three bonds, with long
maturities, low interest rates and (two of them) at a discount. There has been
partial creditor participation in the debt exchange offer and its deadline was
extended twice. The larger domestic creditors (the National Bank of Dominica and
the Social Security) and one of the two large bond issues have agreed in principle
to participate. Discussions with the other private external creditors are continuing.
Discussions with bilateral creditors are at an advanced stage, some of them have
expressed a preference for waiting until the private debt deal is completed. The
Caribbean Development Bank has agreed “in principle” to a debt restructuring
proposal consistent with inter-creditor equity.
Id. at 5, 11 (emphasis omitted).
97. Interview with IMF Staffer (July 18, 2017).
98. See Gulati & Triantis, supra note 87, at 996–97.
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limit their ability to credibly influence third parties. As explained
by one market participant who has worked exclusively on
emerging market sovereign debt since its origin in the 1990s,
private-sector creditors have limited trust in the IMF. They see the
IMF and private-sector creditors as having fundamentally
conflicting interests when both are lenders to the same country,99
and they see themselves as being in contest with public-sector
lenders and at an informational disadvantage relative to them:
It’s not a level playing field. The debt sustainability analysis
does not make public all of the assumptions the IMF has, so the
private sector is playing a guessing game to figure things out. The
IMF has more information than the private sector, but they’re not
giving it out. The private sector says, give us all the tools you’re
using and let us do our own analysis, so we can be on the same
level playing field as you. There is a tension when the
determination is made about whether the country is holding all it
can or is not doing all it can . . . . It’s not a search for the truth if
one party is holding more of the cards.100

One example of a disagreement between the IMF’s assessment of
ability to pay and that of creditors is the Iraq debt restructuring
during the early 2000s. Some creditors believed that the IMF’s debt
sustainability analysis underestimated Iraq’s expected oil income.101
Moreover, the IMF and other multilateral financial institutions
are political institutions. They have multiple objectives that are not
always aligned with the interests of particular creditors or
creditors’ rights in principle. They are often portrayed as having
political stakes in particular outcomes.102 The positions the
99. See Panizza et al., supra note 1, at 671–72.
100. Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017).
101. Joanna Chung & Stephen Fidler, Why Iraqi Debt Is No Longer a Write-Off, FIN. TIMES

(July 16, 2006), https://www.ft.com/content/b94bccb4-14e7-11db-b391-0000779e2340. Creditors in that case were restrained from litigating because of the heavy involvement of the
official sector in support of Iraq.
102. See, e.g., Larry Elliott, IMF’s Own Watchdog Criticises Its Handling of Eurozone Crisis,
GUARDIAN (July 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/28/imf
-watchdog-criticises-handling-eurozone-crisis; Martin Sandbu, Beware Greeks Bearing Rifts:
Why Varoufakis Couldn’t Fix the Debt Crisis, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2018), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-12-12/beware-greeks-bearing-rifts;
Heather Stewart, IMF Will Refuse to Join Greek Bailout Until Debt Relief Demands Are Met,
GUARDIAN (July 30, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/30/imf-will
-refuse-join-greek-bailout-until-debt-relief-demands-met.
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multilateral institutions take in sovereign debt disputes are not
based on transparent, predefined, universal, objective criteria, and
are not always justified by publicly reasoned decisions.
Ecuador’s default in 2008 illustrates the various reasons for
creditors’ limited trust of multilateral lending institutions.
Ecuador’s President Correa staged an “audit” of the country’s
foreign-issued debt, which concluded that the country’s foreign
debt was illegitimate and illegal on grounds ranging from legally
incorrect and logically unsound to plausible.103 The report
scathingly criticized both Ecuador’s private-sector and publicsector creditors, and concluded that loans from both involved
irregularities.104 Nonetheless, when Ecuador selectively and
opportunistically defaulted on several of its bonds in 2008, it
announced that it would not default on the $4.3 billion it owed to
the multilateral lending institutions.105 Ecuador admittedly had no
fiscal need to default, and its coercive restructuring flouted
practices of transparency and good-faith negotiating promoted by
the multilateral lending institutions. Yet, to creditors’ consternation, no multilateral institution criticized Ecuador’s imposition
on creditors of a sixty-five percent haircut.106 Officials of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB) backed Ecuador.107 Reuters
reported that analysts said the Bank’s backing “could strengthen
Ecuador’s position against bondholders by giving some legitimacy
to the default and signaling that the tiny country holds the upper
hand in negotiations . . . .”108 One market analyst likened the

103. The audit was conducted by political appointees and not conducted with the
counsel or participation of professional auditors according to accounting standards. See
Porzecanski, supra note 56, at 270.
104. Id.
105. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Coroner’s Inquest, 28 INT’L FIN. L. REV.,
Sept. 2009, at 22; Most Holders of “Illegal” Debt Settle with Ecuador, LATINLAWYER ONLINE (June
12, 2009), https://files.skadden.com/sites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fpublications%2FPublica
tions1891_0.pdf.
106. See Felix Salmon, Lessons from Ecuador’s Bond Default, REUTERS: FELIX SALMON
(May 29, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/29/lessons-from-ecuadors
-bond-default/ (describing creditors’ frustrations with the default and the multilateral
lending institutions’ stance on it); Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 105, at 22.
107. See Porzecanski, supra note 56, at 268.
108. Alexandria Valencia & Alonso Soto, Regional Lenders Back Ecuador in Debt Talks,
REUTERS (May 18, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-caf-loans-idUSTRE
54H58220090518.
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IADB’s support to “saying that Ecuador has a very strong hand
against bondholders in a poker game,” which “could prompt more
investors to participate (in the buyback) to avoid being on the
losing side.”109 An IMF official stated, “We understand that
Ecuador’s decision to default on these bonds is based on a dispute
about [their] legal validity rather than [on] debt sustainability
[grounds], and of course we don’t take sides on the merits.”110
The stance taken by the multilateral institutions on Ecuador’s
default was not decided through a transparent process based on
rules known in advance. To the contrary, the support of Ecuador
was inconsistent with customary market norms previously
affirmed by the institutions about acceptable reasons for defaulting
and how restructuring should be carried out. Moreover, the
multilateral lending institutions had an apparent conflict of interest
between their dual roles as lenders and market monitors. Ecuador
levied many of the same allegations of legal violations and
illegitimacy against their loans as it did against its private-sector
debt but offered to stand down from repudiating public-sector debt
and to force private-sector creditors to take the fall. It is not difficult
to see, therefore, why market participants lack confidence in the
multilateral institutions as reputation intermediaries.
2. Credit rating agencies
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) provide standardized reputational signals, combining various dimensions of sovereign
borrower risk—including economic, political, and institutional
factors111—into a single credit rating. Ratings are forward-looking
assessments of creditworthiness, measured either as the risk of
default or the expected loss through default.112 For sovereigns,

109. Id.
110. Transcript of Regular Press Briefing by Caroline Atkinson, Director, External Relations

Department, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr
/2008/tr121808.htm, quoted in Porzecanski, supra note 56, at 269.
111. See Standard & Poor’s Ratings Servs., How We Rate Sovereigns (Feb. 13, 2015),
https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/774196/How+We+Rate+Sovereigns.pdf
/a9419c9e-eb76-4283-83a6-34d0e8b13112.
112. S&P’s ratings only seek to capture the risk of default occurring, whereas Moody’s
tries to capture expected loss, a broader measure, and Fitch employs a hybrid that focuses
only on default probability until default occurs, at which time it distinguishes based on
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unlike corporations, they include an assessment of the risk of
opportunistic default.113 Rating agencies maintain ratings continuously, reassess them periodically, and affirm or change them upon
the occurrence of significant events that might impact creditworthiness. Agencies publish not only the alphanumeric rating
category but also reasons for changing a rating or reports about
particular issuers.114
Default is reflected in ratings in two ways. S&P’s approach is
illustrative. First, a sovereign’s rating is immediately adjusted to D
(Default) or SD (Selective Default) and remains in that category as
long as it is in default.115 Agencies make their own determination
of whether an action by the government is a default and do not rely
on legal definitions of default.116 Default might include
nonpayment or delayed payment of principal or interest, or any
contract modification that reduces the value of bonds in a manner

expected recovery rates after default occurs. Ashok Vir Bhatia, Sovereign Credit Ratings
Methodology: An Evaluation 4–5 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/02/170, 2002).
113. See NORBERT GAILLARD, A CENTURY OF SOVEREIGN RATINGS 13 (2012); S&P Glob.
Ratings, General Criteria: Principles of Credit Ratings 6 (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.standard
andpoors.com/en_US/delegate/getPDF;jsessionid=9B0556F3C518FE65F2041644D9DED00
7?articleId=2017767&type=COMMENTS&subType=REGULATORY.
114. See, e.g., Fitch Upgrades Argentina’s Foreign Currency IDR to ‘B’; Outlook Stable, BUS.
WIRE (May 10, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2016051000
6412/en/Fitch-Upgrades-Argentinas-Foreign-Currency-IDR-Outlook; Press Release, Moody’s
Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody’s Upgrades Argentina’s Issuer Rating to B3 with a
Stable Outlook (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-upgrades
-Argentinas-issuer-rating-to-B3-with-a-stable—PR_347279; Press Release, S&P Glob. Mkt.
Intelligence, S&P Affirms Argentina Ratings (Apr. 15, 2016) (affirming a B- debt rating).
115. See, e.g., S&P Glob. Ratings, Research Update: Ukraine Foreign Currency Ratings
Lowered To ‘SD’ (Selective Default) on Distressed Debt Restructuring (Sept. 25, 2015),
https://www.standardandpoors.com//en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/20014208
(reporting change to Ukraine’s rating prompted by its seeking to restructure its debt; rating
adjustment announced three days after the government’s announcement). Moody’s does not
use a “default” category but considers “Track Record of Default” as a factor that is used to
adjust the score for “Institutional Strength,” one of four factors that go to a sovereign’s credit
rating. See GAILLARD, supra note 113, at 26–27; Moody’s Inv’rs Serv., Rating Methodology:
Sovereign Bond Ratings 3 (Dec. 22, 2016).
116. See Bhatia, supra note 112, at 9; S&P Glob. Ratings, Research Update: Ukraine, supra
note 115 (determining that Ukraine’s invitation to bondholders to buy back debt is a
“distressed debt restructuring”). See generally S&P Glob. Ratings, General Criteria: Rating
Implications of Exchange Offers and Similar Restructurings, Update (May 12, 2009),
https://www.taiwanratings.com/portal/front/showCustomArticle/2c9c31d755d00f86015
6253779ee0074 (defining the criteria for determining when an exchange offering constitutes
a distressed debt restructuring).
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the agency deems to be “coercive, involuntary, and distressed.”117
Even a voluntary bond exchange might be classified as a default if
the agency determines that creditors restructured because they
expected that nonparticipation would leave them worse off.118
Once a sovereign has cured a default, its rating is adjusted to
reflect the agency’s assessment of the state’s default risk at that
time. The past default is taken into account because of its impact on
other economic circumstances that go into the rating, as well as in
the consideration of the country’s “debt payment culture.” Debt
repayment culture is a “potential adjustment factor” that can
reduce the sovereign’s scaled score in the Institutional Assessment,
one of the five assessments that go into the rating. A sovereign
determined to have a weak debt payment culture always receives
an Institutional Assessment score of six, the lowest possible score.
The Institutional Assessment score in turn caps the sovereign’s
rating at BB+, which is speculative grade.119
Sovereign ratings by CRAs are decided by the ratings
committee, in which a group of analysts pore over economic data
and debate qualitative factors to process scores on input criteria,
and other considerations, into ratings.120 After debate, a nominated
subset of the group votes on scores for various categories and,
ultimately, on the final ranking.121
The ability of CRAs to offer investors assurance that they will
serve as effective reputation intermediaries is compromised by the
CRAs’ own reputation problems and the information risk that they
face. Sovereign ratings have been criticized as political,122
incompetent,123 and conflicted,124 not least because sovereigns pay
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See GAILLARD, supra note 113, at 13; Bhatia, supra note 112, at 9.
Bhatia, supra note 112, at 10.
S&P Glob. Ratings, Sovereign Rating Methodology 41–42 (Dec. 23, 2014).
Bhatia, supra note 112, at 10.
Id. at 12, 26.
Paul Krugman, The Plot Against France, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2013), https://www.
nytimes.com/2013/11/11/opinion/krugman-the-plot-against-france.html; Frank Partnoy,
The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 662 (1999).
123. Bathurst Reg’l Council v Local Gov’t Fin Servs Pty Ltd [No. 5] (2012) FCA 1200, ¶53
(Federal Court) (Austl.).
124. BARTHOLOMEW PAUDYN, CREDIT RATINGS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CREDITWORTHINESS THROUGH RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 1 (2014); Bhatia, supra
note 112, at 32–50.
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to be rated.125 Frank Partnoy has thoroughly described the limited
informational value and reputational deficiencies of credit ratings.126
While the divergence between market opinion and credit raters’
opinions became more apparent during the Euro crisis, the gap
between credit ratings and what investors care about was not new.127
Rating agencies are also subject to information risks. Sovereigns
have information-sharing agreements with CRAs, from whom they
solicit ratings that require the sovereign to grant access to relevant
information and personnel.128 CRAs collect most of their data
directly from sovereigns. While they try to triangulate with other
sources, the quality of their ratings is heavily influenced by the
quality of the country’s data and the extent of its cooperation.129 A
sovereign in trouble can hide relevant information in ways that are
difficult for an agency to detect.130 A study of sovereign ratings
concluded that “[t]he first and most basic problem confronting the
ratings agencies is information risk”; “[s]overeign ratings analysts
have limited ability to corroborate official data”; “ratings [are] often
assigned or maintained in the absence of full information” because
125. Elaine Moore, Do Sovereign Credit Ratings Still Matter? FIN. TIMES (July 14, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/fa563ac4-492e-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab; Jeannette Neumann,
SEC Charges Egan-Jones, Says Firm Exaggerated Its Expertise, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 24, 2012,
7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303592404577364132973207216.
126. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, What’s (Still) Wrong with Credit Ratings, 92 W ASH. L. REV.
1407 (2017); Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers,
in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert
E. Litan eds., 2006); Partnoy, supra note 122.
127. The head of Fitch’s sovereign ratings acknowledged, “What we look at and what
investors look at is not always the same thing.” Moore, supra note 125. When the modern
emerging market bond market began to develop, ratings of emerging market sovereigns
were untested and rating agencies already had credibility deficits from their ratings of other
types of debt. Bhatia, supra note 112, at 42 (using statistical analysis of defaults and ratings
to find consistent upside bias), 43–45 (discussing information risk, analytical constraints, and
revenue bias). An early failure in sovereign ratings occurred during the 1997–98 Asian crisis,
when emerging market ratings and the emerging market bond market were relatively new.
Id. at 6; Emerging Mkt. Traders Ass’n, History and Development, EMTA, http://www.emta
.org/template.aspx?id=34 (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
128. Rating agencies have access to government information and officials when ratings
are solicited. Their analysts meet with officials from the “treasury or finance ministry, central
bank, and other ministries responsible for areas of key economic importance . . . , politicians
within and outside government.” They also speak with official and private-sector observers
within and outside the country. S&P Glob. Rankings, Sovereign Rating Methodology, supra note
119, at 41–42.
129. Bhatia, supra note 112, at 43.
130. Id. at 42.
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of limited cooperation by governments; and “data shortcomings or
willful concealment generally” are biased to the benefit of the
sovereign.131 CRAs also have limited analytic capacity because of
resource constraints.132 This leads to a conservatism that reduces
the accuracy of ratings since a substantial part of what CRAs do is
aggregate opinions from the creditor and debtor sides of the market
through a rather opaque process.133
Finally, investors’ reliance on credit ratings varies depending
on their investment strategies. While some passive investors rely
heavily on credit ratings, other investors conduct their own, more
sophisticated analyses to improve the forecasts of credit rating
agencies.134 Nondiscretionary holdings by financial institutions
compose a large proportion of sovereign bond holdings. Such
bonds are held as part of mandates that prescribe features of the
combination of equities that investment managers’ portfolios must
contain. For example, a fund manager might be mandated to mimic
the performance of the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate
Index. She will then hold sovereign bonds as dictated by a passive
sampling method that buys and sells securities to match those in
the index. A percentage of the fund will comprise, for example,
emerging market sovereign bonds of a certain rating. Alternatively,
a manager might have a mandate to hold a certain share of bonds
with a particular credit rating, or bonds that are investment grade.
Under these investing approaches, some of which are regulation
driven, a drop in a sovereign’s credit rating below a certain level
will automatically prompt a sale.135 Discretionary investment, in
contrast, tries to beat the market and relies less on credit ratings.
Some discretionary investors attend more carefully to the legal

131. Id. at 43–44.
132. Id. at 45.
133. See id.; see also GAILLARD, supra note 113, at 14 (describing how S&P’s actual criteria

differ from its published criteria: S&P states that its ratings reflect only default probability,
but its ratings might also reflect expected severity of default).
134. Interview subjects confirmed this to be the case in sovereign debt investment.
Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Economist (July 6, 2017); Interview with Distressed
Debt Researcher and Advisor (Mar. 2, 2014). Other scholars have found the same to be true
of investors in other fixed income markets. See Jane Tripp Howe, Credit Analysis for Corporate
Bonds, in BOND CREDIT ANALYSIS: FRAMEWORK AND CASE STUDIES 43 (Frank J. Fabozzi
ed., 2001).
135. Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017).
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terms in bonds; distressed debt investors scrutinize the legal terms
closely.136 But notice also that the ability of a drop in a sovereign’s
credit rating to automatically trigger bond sales and to exclude its
debt from many large portfolios increases the reputational leverage
a holdout creditor can have by lengthening the time in default or
showing a creditor to be unwilling, rather than unable, to pay.
III. WHY COURTS?
As discussed above, scholars usually think of formal legal
enforcement through courts as an alternative to informal
enforcement. In the literature discussing opting out of the legal
system, parties eschew courts because courts do not cost-effectively
provide incentives that reduce the risk of contract failure to an
acceptable level, given the value of trade at stake. In those cases,
courts have one or more of several weaknesses. They are corrupt or
incompetent; they apply rules, interpretive methods, or remedies
unsuited to the trade; or resorting to litigation undermines an
ongoing commercial relationship that the parties wish to sustain.
Traders therefore develop alternatives to expand the domain of
value-creating exchange.137 Why, in the sovereign bond context, do
courts emerge as the lowest-cost provider of certain types of
important information? Why do actors in this market, which by
most accounts runs on informal enforcement, resort to courts?
The sovereign debt market’s reliance on courts together with
other sources of reputation information is, to some extent, a “belt
and braces” approach to reputation verification. The previous Part
outlined the weaknesses of other sources of information. Just as
sovereigns solicit ratings from multiple credit rating agencies and
investors triangulate among multiple agencies’ ratings, it is not

136. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Litigators (July 29, 2017); Interview with
Senior Sovereign Debt Economist (July 6, 2017); Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28,
2017).
137. Bernstein’s diamond merchants, for instance, resorted to informal governance in
part because courts could not offer remedies that would reliably and adequately compensate
merchants for contract breaches. Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 11. Similarly, the legal
system would not support the relations of Greif’s Maghribi traders because the promises
they exchanged were not of an enforceable type, because courts could not verify their actions,
and because courts could not reach traders in distant locales or their assets to exercise
enforcement authority. See Greif, supra note 50.
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surprising that, in a high-stakes market governed largely by reputation, actors choose to also make courts available as an alternative
adjudicator of reputation.138
But courts also provide information that other providers cannot
or will not provide. Through litigation, holdout creditors can reveal
information that other reputation-shaping institutions do not
provide and that matters to investors and other third parties with
sanctioning power. One distressed debt investor who has sued a
defaulting sovereign put it thus: “We’re the only ones who have the
financial means, motivation and sophistication to unravel
incredibly sophisticated schemes.”139 A baseline requirement for
courts to function in this capacity is that the value at stake in
sovereign debt disputes warrants resort to litigation. Unlike many
other markets in which contractual obligations are enforced
primarily by reputation, monitoring costs and sums at stake in the
sovereign debt market are often sufficiently high to justify recourse
to costly litigation.
If this condition is satisfied, courts can perform three distinctive
information functions in sovereign debt disputes. First, unlike other
reputational institutions, they can make legal determinations that
coordinate and uphold market participants’ expectations. Second,
courts have unique information-forcing and processing powers.
Third, creditors use litigation to reframe the political and moral
aspects of sovereign debt disputes.
A. Legal Determinations Matter
Actors in the sovereign debt market accept the decisions of the
courts that decide sovereign debt disputes as authoritative on
whether certain behavior at the local level—that is, between
particular parties—constitutes breach.140 By choosing New York
law and submitting in its bond indenture to litigation in New York,
a sovereign commits to having its treatment of individual

138. Cf. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International
Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 931–36 (discussing the
literature on how states create international tribunals to enhance the reputational impact of
violations of international law).
139. Aram Roston, Vulture Capitalism, PLAYBOY, Dec. 2010, at 60, 185 (quoting a
distressed debt investor).
140. Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 20, at 10.
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creditors judged against its contractual obligations and a body of
law that instantiates commercial norms widely accepted by the
market in a public forum trusted by creditors. New York law and
courts take a formalistic, predictable approach to adjudicating
business disputes. These features of judicial decision-making
contrast sharply with the decision-making processes of the other
information intermediaries operating in this market, described
above.141 First, courts attend to the complaints of individual
creditors. Since courts uniquely apply legal rules and legal reasoning
through a legal process, they assure transacting parties of some
measure of stability of norms and their application. By doing so,
they support planning and investment. This function of courts is
fundamentally different from the reputational function served by
CRAs and multilateral financial institutions.
This function of law and courts in sovereign debt disputes is a
paradigmatic example of a legal order without centralized
enforcement as theorized by Hadfield and Weingast. Parties to
sovereign debt contracts choose New York or UK law as the rules
that govern their contractual relationships. As Hadfield and
Weingast explain, those rules assign behavior to the classification of
“breaching” or “nonbreaching.” Parties choose the courts of those
jurisdictions to authoritatively apply the chosen classification
rules.142 Hadfield and Weingast find an equilibrium in a repeated
game in which a third-party institution providing such a “common
logic” sustains collective enforcement. Their equilibrium requires the
coordinating institution to operate according to classic attributes of
law, including “generality,” “stability,” “qualified universality,”
“clarity, noncontradiction,” and “impersonal, neutral, and independent reasoning.”143 These are defining features of courts.

141. See supra Section II.D.
142. See Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 20, at 7–8.
143. Id. at 3–9. I depart from Hadfield and Weingast’s requirement of punishment.

Their model involves what is known as “altruistic punishment” because parties that respond
to negative reputational signals by declining to transact do not do so out of immediate selfinterest. As explained above, I build on Tomz’s theory of the sovereign debt market, which
rests not on altruistic punishment but on self-interested responses to heightened risk. See
supra notes 57–68 and associated text. Hadfield and Weingast’s model nonetheless applies
because they separate the adjudicator’s information-production role from its remedial role
and show that the former can support a legal order.
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Completely private ordering requires a shared understanding
of what behaviors constitute violations of norms that warrant
sending negative reputation signals to the market.144 The complexity of sovereign debt contracting renders it impossible for private
coordination to categorize all relevant behaviors. Adjudication
therefore substitutes for this aspect of private order. As explained
above, other things being equal, investors consider a sovereign that
treats creditors poorly during default worse than one that
restructures in a way that creditors perceive as fair.145 Default
activates a number of other contract terms such as collective action
clauses and other provisions envisaged to enable restructuring. A
sovereign is subject to additional reputational penalties for failing
to renegotiate and conduct its default in accordance with the terms
of the bond and in good faith.
In hard cases—those in which the behavior of the parties is
difficult to categorize under their respective legal rights and
obligations—courts determine the content of sovereign promises
and verify adherence to, or breach of, those promises rather than
leaving those determinations to a contest of allegations. They
therefore protect not only creditor expectations but also sovereign
expectations and reputation against opportunistic creditors. In that
sense, courts attend to reputation on a micro level, examining the
bilateral relationship. They judge treatment of particular creditors
and empower those creditors to demand that the state’s treatment
of them be publicly judged against legal rules that embody market
expectations for contractual counterparties. CRAs and the IMF, by
contrast, focus on sovereign behavior at a macro level.

144. See MacLeod, supra note 20. One way that parties address situations in which
contractual performance is poorly correlated with outcomes is through warranties. Under a
warranty, the performing party can prevent the dissatisfied counterparty from sending a
negative reputation signal to the market by paying compensation or remediating the
unsatisfactory outcome. See id. However, warranties such as those that promise to remedy
product defects are unsuitable to bonds because a bond failure—a default—will affect a high
proportion of bonds at once and ipso facto involves a (real or claimed) inability to pay
amounts owed. This latter feature necessarily implies an inability to make a warranty
payment sufficient to make creditors whole. See JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF
CORPORATE REPUTATION 17–20 (2013). In close-knit communities, other sources of norm
coordination exist, such as shared religion or ethnicity. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note
11; Greif, supra note 50; Landa, supra note 50.
145. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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The obligation to repay under sovereign debt contracts is
usually sufficiently simple that a minimally informed observer can
see that a default has occurred. Sovereign debt contracts require
repayment of specified sums on specified dates. Credit rating
agencies and trade associations declare default within days of
nonpayment. Courts routinely decide on summary judgment that
default has occurred. When other legal issues presented require a
full hearing, the analysis of whether default occurred is
straightforward and brief.146 However, other rights and obligations
of the parties to sovereign bond contracts are complex. The contract
might contain collective action clauses, exit consents, amendment
clauses, acceleration clauses, cross-default clauses, or aggregation
clauses that require interpretation and application to facts to
determine whether a promisor has run afoul of its obligations. The
governing law supplies additional rights and obligations. The
rights and obligations specified in the contract and the governing
law can powerfully impact restructuring negotiations. Courts have
the capacity and credibility to resolve disputes concerning these
terms in ways that market participants will accept. Even without
formal enforcement, the courts’ pronouncements establish authoritative decisions on parties’ competing claims.147
Elliott Associates v. Peru offers an illuminating example of this
function of courts and a related hypothetical.148 Peru argued that
Elliott was not a valid assignee for various reasons, including that
its purchase of debt on the secondary market violated New York’s
champerty law.149 It was not obvious how New York’s champerty
law, which was a century old, applied to the new investment

146. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(“Failure to tender payment pursuant to a contract is a material breach. Therefore, where a
contract unambiguously requires the defendant to make payments pursuant to its terms, and
the defendant fails to make said payments, judgment must issue in favor of the plaintiff.
These principles are routinely applied in favor of creditors suing foreign states on defaulted
loan agreements.” (citations omitted)).
147. See Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 20. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt
Lawyer VI (Aug. 22, 2017) (“The mere fact of a judgment or arbitral award has force, there is no
doubt about that. . . . The judgment then resolves the issue that there’s no dispute to be had
whether the money’s due. The judgment or award has a legal consequence or moral effect.”).
148. Elliott Assocs., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (reversed by Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion,
194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999)).
149. Id. at 344.
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strategy of distressed sovereign debt investors. The practice was
controversial, even among investors, because distressed debt
investors frustrated other creditors’ efforts to restructure their debt
holdings by buying debt on the verge of restructuring and refusing
to participate.150 The district court discussed the commercial policy
implications of barring the practices of the distressed debt investors
by applying champerty law:
Elliott’s position is strong as a matter of policy in the world of
commerce. Peru borrowed billions of dollars from commercial
banks in exchange for the obligation to repay the principal with
interest. Peru spent the borrowed funds, and now refuses to repay
an assignee of the debt. Failure to enforce a bargain between
sophisticated parties such as Peru and their lenders would,
according to Elliott, undermine reasonable expectations about
contract law, the terra firma upon which contemporary business
transactions are based. Moreover, restrictions on the rights of
commercial lenders to assign the debt were not negotiated for by
Peru, and imposing some restriction here seems at odds with the
strong policy in favor of the free alienability of property. Cast in
this light, § 489[, the champerty statute,] seems to fit
uncomfortably with current sensibilities—a relic of Medieval
English legal concerns about the perversion of judicial process
given effect by the common law doctrine of champerty.151

After concluding the discussion with the counterpoint, “Yet, the
Court’s role here is not to make policy assessments[,]”152 the court
held that the creditor’s actions violated the state’s champerty law.
The Second Circuit overturned the ruling, determining that the
creditor’s conduct did not constitute champerty.153 It supported its
holding with both legal and commercial policy reasoning. The
commercial policy analysis was that applying champerty law to
disallow assignment of distressed debt would render restructurings
effectively involuntary and force creditors to “participate in an
involuntary ‘cram-down’ procedure.”154
Had the Second Circuit upheld Peru’s victory on the issue in the
district court, and if Elliott were the only remaining holdout, Peru
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 335–36.
Id. at 345.
Id.

Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 380.
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would have had no legal obligation to pay Elliott, and Elliott would
have lost any power to prevent Peru from curing its default in the
eyes of the market. That outcome would have reduced Peru’s time
in default and therefore the harm to its reputation. Future bond
purchasers might have demanded a higher yield from emerging
market sovereign bonds given the reduced liquidity revealed or
created by the court’s decision, but there would be no reason for
them to see Peru as posing any special risk because it had
successfully asserted its legal rights.
B. Gathering and Processing Facts
Creditors use courts to reveal two types of factual information
relevant to sovereign debtor reputation. The first type is relevant to
reputation for promise keeping and law adherence. To apply the
relevant rules to the instant case, a court must, of course, ascertain
the relevant facts. During a contentious dispute, courts have the
institutional capacity to obtain and process factual information
necessary to determine the parties’ legal rights and obligations. In
addition, courts play a second informational role in this market.
They allow creditors to obtain information that is not directly
relevant to whether breach occurred, but that goes to the state’s
ability to pay. This information is relevant, for different reasons, to
third parties who have power to punish the government officials
responsible for the decision not to pay the creditors.
1. Facts that determine legal rights and obligations
Courts ascertain facts about the behavior of debtors and
creditors during default and restructuring processes. The adjudicated facts in turn determine the parties’ legal rights and
obligations, which, as explained above, matter to investors and
other potential transactors with the sovereign.155 For example, in
the litigation between Elliott Management and Panama arising out
of that state’s restructuring of syndicated bank loans, an issue of
law was whether Panama even owed any contractual obligation to
Elliott. Panama argued that the assignments of the debt to Elliott
were invalid because more than half of the lenders had activated

155. See supra Section III.A.
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the original contract’s amendment clause, thus barring assignment
of the debt. Whether the assignments were valid hinged on a
disputed factual issue: the date on which the assignments were
made. In finding that the assignments were made before the
deadline imposed by the restructuring agreement, the court
assessed no fewer than eight independent sources of evidence in
the record and highlighted undisputed facts that supported the
court’s conclusion as to the dates.156
Two aspects of the court’s institutional capacity permitted it to
adjudicate the disputed facts: it was empowered to collect evidence
through sworn testimony and document production and to
authoritatively determine the truth of the matter. Absent the
judicial power to compel the production of evidence and take
testimony under oath, each party could hide evidence as to
disputed facts and indefinitely maintain the truthfulness of its
position, leading to a reputational impasse. Absent a credible thirdparty adjudicator to render a decision on these disputed issues of
fact, reputation for promise keeping and law adherence could not
be authenticated.157 The state and the lenders that wanted to
restructure could have colluded against the unpopular holdout.
While CRAs and multilateral financial institutions have
significant access to information about sovereign debtors, courts
have unique information production capacities. They allow the
parties to demand the production of information of their choosing.
Even if a court has little ability to sanction a sovereign for resisting
judicial information-gathering power, defiance of a court is
publicized and results in adverse reputational inferences. Stonewalling a court, or being found to have provided false or
misleading documents or testimony, poses a greater risk to
reputation than evading or misleading a CRA. That is not least
because a CRA has incentives not to report being misled or

156. Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Pan., 975 F. Supp. 332, 337–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(describing and assessing the evidence offered by both parties, which included sworn
testimony by an executive of Elliott Associates as to the procedure by which the transaction
was concluded and the relevant dates, “hand-written trade tickets and confirmatory
documents,” copies of letters from the original lenders to the courts in related proceedings
in state court, “Assignment Notices” submitted to Panama by the original lenders and Elliott,
and sworn testimony by an employee of one of the defendant banks as to the meaning of
those “Assignment Notices”).
157. Cf. Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 923–24 (2018).
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stonewalled, but also because its process lacks the public
performance element of judicial process. Additionally, litigating
creditors can compel information from third parties that courts can
sanction. The New York or London forum selection clause thus
operates as a reputation bond posted by creditors and sovereigns
to back a commitment to honesty and forthrightness during the
restructuring process.
2. Facts relevant to other dimensions of reputation
As discussed above, one way that creditors can increase
reputational harm to sovereign debtors is by revealing information
on multiple dimensions of reputation.158 Third parties who have the
power to sanction public officials might do so for reasons apart
from the officials’ decisions to breach duties owed to creditors.
Creditors have pursued this strategy by using sovereign debt
litigation to reveal corrupt activities by debtor state governments.
They argue that the state is able to pay but that the government is
unwilling to pay because political leaders are diverting public
funds to themselves. Corruption revelations might hurt a country’s
bond market position with sovereign bond investors, who look at
both economic fundamentals and political risk.159 The market
considers sovereigns that default opportunistically to be higher
risk, all else equal.160 Credit rating agencies’ institutional assessments consider corruption.161 But corruption is more reliably
harmful to reputation across social fields than is reputation for
treatment of creditors. Whereas the domestic population might
reward the government for reneging on foreign-issued debt, it is
unlikely to view the misappropriation of public funds favorably.
Similarly, while foreign countries and multilateral institutions that
have relationships with the debtor and that provide aid, loans, and
other economic benefits might side with a sovereign regarding

158. See supra Section IV.B.2.
159. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Economist (July 6, 2017) (identifying

corruption as a key issue in the political assessment that goes into sovereign debt investment,
advising: “[I]t’s all about the economic fundamentals and the politics. We would hire
political scientists.”).
160. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
161. See S&P Glob. Rankings, Sovereign Rating Methodology, supra note 119, at 11–12.
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payment of creditors, the revelation of corruption makes those
actors less willing or able—for ethical, political, and reputational
reasons—to maintain support for the debtor.
Domestic political constituencies, other states, and public
multilateral lending institutions take a more reliably negative view
of corruption than of failing to pay foreign creditors. Lengthy
sovereign default disputes tend to involve countries with severe,
systemic corruption.162 Leveraging that fact, creditors have, in
several cases, pursued a strategy of using discovery to uncover
corruption, thereby imposing the threat of ongoing reputational
damage on ruling elites as long as litigation continues. These costs
can help creditors through two mechanisms. In the first,
government officials implicated in corruption are pressured to
settle to prevent further discovery of their corrupt activities. In the
second, the corruption revelations undermine the sitting government and open the door for a new government willing to settle with
creditors. As two senior sovereign debt lawyers explained, “The
strategy . . . is . . . to allow the political forces at play within the
country to know that this is an obligation that needs to be dealt
with. . . . You hope you might find some assets, but that’s not the
primary reason [for suing].”163 The lawyers explained that in one
dispute they got the attention of politicians in powerful Western
countries and elevated the dispute to an international relations
issue by using litigation to uncover the corrupt activities of the
government in power in the debtor state.164
Two recent cases are illustrative. A holdout against the
Republic of Congo leveraged discovery of corruption by the
country’s autocratic president, his family, and other top officials to
obtain a settlement of its debt claim. Through discovery, for
example, creditors of the Republic of Congo uncovered shell
companies used to misappropriate oil assets and showed that the
president’s son had used funds from those companies for personal

162. See Roger Parloff, Judge: Vulture Fund Leaked Documents to Human Rights Group,
FORTUNE (Aug. 21, 2007), http://fortune.com/2007/08/21/judge-vulture-fund-leaked
-documents-to-human-rights-group/.
163. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Litigators (July 29, 2017).
164. Id.
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purchases of luxury goods.165 Creditors disclosed the incriminating
documents to the anti-corruption organization Global Witness,
which posted them to its website together with an analysis of the
corruption they revealed. The creditors also released the documents to news outlets in several countries.166 The information was
widely reported and drew attention both within and outside the
Republic of Congo.167
The creditors obtained the documents through a Hong Kong
court. After Global Witness, based in London, published the
documents on its website, an offshore company owned by Denis
Sassou-Nguesso, the son of the Congolese president, asked a UK
court to order that they be taken down.168 The UK court decided in
Global Witness’s favor, not only in permitting public disclosure of
the documents but also in publishing a reasoned decision for his
ruling, which compounded the reputational damage by publicizing
efforts to hide the information. Sassou-Nguesso had asked the court
to discharge the case confidentially, which would have prevented
the publication of the court’s decision and prevented Global
Witness from speaking about the case. Sassou-Nguesso also asked
the judge not to refer in his opinion to the litigation in Hong Kong
because the courts there had kept the proceedings confidential. The
court rejected all of the claimant’s secrecy requests and disclosed
them in the opinion, asserting a strong public interest in disclosure
of the details of the litigation. He explained,
If I were not to refer to the order [of the Hong Kong court],
I would in my view give to the public a misleading account of
the relevant events and of the matters I have taken into account
in reaching my conclusion. . . . If I were to refer to that order in
a separate confidential judgment, I should preclude GW and
others from referring to it. In the context of this case, . . . there
is a significant public interest in the subject matter of
GW’s publications . . . .169

The information revealed through the litigation catalyzed
several chain reactions that put pressure on Congolese officials. The
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

540

See Long Beach Ltd. v. Glob. Witness Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB), [9]–[15] (Eng.).
See id. at [40.7].
See id. at [42].
See id. at [18].
Id. at [28].
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detailed corruption revelations were a political liability within
Congo. An anti-corruption activist in the country told the New York
Times, “If it were not for these vulture funds, we would not know
any facts about the way our country’s wealth is being taken
away . . . . We don’t agree with their ultimate aims, but they are the
only ones capable of exposing the truth.”170 Revelations of
corruption also prompted political action in donor countries. A
Member of the UK Parliament sought information from the UK
Secretary of State for International Development about what
actions had been taken by the IMF, the European Union, and the
UK government regarding corruption relating to CongoBrazzaville’s oil trade.171 The documents were brought before the
U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Diane E. Watson,
who described the corruption revealed by the documents at length,
highlighted the poverty of the Congolese population, and
suggested that Congo was in breach of its commitments under a
multilateral debt relief program. 172
Donor countries have the power to block aid and lending to
countries such as Congo. While the creditors were uncovering
details about the misappropriation of Congolese oil revenues,
Congo was negotiating for conditional aid from a joint program of
the IMF and World Bank. The institutions agreed preliminarily to
provide debt relief but required the country to reduce corruption
before it would qualify for permanent debt relief. The revelation of
new corrupt activities threatened the country’s receipt of funds
from the multilateral financial institutions.173
The details revealed through the litigation about how officials
structured oil transactions to misappropriate funds were valuable
to Global Witness and enabled it to expand its own investigations.
The organization knew that corruption was occurring in the oil

170. Lydia Polgreen, Unlikely Ally Against Congo Graft, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/world/africa/10congo.html.
171. See Long Beach Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB) at [42].
172. See 110 CONG. REC. E1500 (daily ed. July 11, 2007) (statement of Rep. Diane E.
Watson) (referring to the Global Witness documents).
173. See John Cassidy, The Next Crusade, NEW YORKER (Apr. 9, 2007), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2007/04/09/the-next-crusade; Robert Friedman, The Vulture Wars,
CNN MONEY (June 12, 2006, 10:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/09/news/inter
national/congo_fortune/.
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sector but lacked details about how it was carried out. The creditors
were able to marshal the information-gathering resources of the
courts that were not available to NGOs investigating corruption.174
The litigation produced information about specifically which
Congolese officials were involved, how they were spending their
ill-gotten gains, and which foreign banks and law firms facilitated
the transactions.175
Moreover, the litigation uncovered activities that formed the
basis for separate legal action against not only the state and its
public officials but also parties with which it transacted. The
creditors brought a RICO action in the United States against Congo,
its state-owned oil company, and a French bank, alleging money
laundering and other unlawful activities.176 Third parties that
transacted with Congo now risked being implicated in corruption
and money laundering and becoming embroiled in related legal
action.177 French prosecutors, under pressure from transparency
and anti-corruption NGOs, opened investigations into Congolese
elites who held wealth in France.178 Amid these developments,
Congo settled with the creditor, reportedly paying $90 million of
the $100 million in judgments it held.179
One of Argentina’s creditors pursued a similar strategy when
prosecutors and investigative reporters in Argentina uncovered
evidence of corruption by the Kirchners and a business associate of
theirs, a scandal known in Argentina as “The Route of the
K[irchner]-Money.”180 The creditor obtained discovery orders in

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Interview with Senior Anti-corruption Activist (July 18, 2017).
See id.
See Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 148, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2007).
See also Interview with Felix Salmon (July 28, 2017).
See Interview with Senior Anti-corruption Activist (July 18, 2017); Shirley Pouget,
Why a Trial in Paris Marks a Milestone for Anticorruption Activists, O PEN SOC’Y FOUND. (June 16,
2017), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/why-trial-paris-marks-milestone
-anticorruption-activists.
179. Roston, supra note 139, at 183.
180. See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 2:14–cv–492–RFB–VCF, 2014 WL
3898021, at *2–4 (D. Nev. 2014); Argentina’s Ex-President Kirchner in Court over Another
Corruption Case, FRANCE 24 (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.france24.com/en/20180918
-argentinas-ex-president-kirchner-court-over-another-corruption-case; Santiago Pérez &
Taos Turner, In Argentina, Mix of Money and Politics Stirs Intrigue Around Kirchner, WALL
STREET J. (July 28, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-argentina-mix-of-money-and
-politics-stirs-intrigue-around-kirchner-1406601002 (discussing the corruption scandal).
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U.S. Federal Court in Nevada relating to straw companies set up by
the Panamanian law firm Mossack & Fonseca of the infamous
Panama Papers leaks. Those straw companies allegedly were used
to embezzle $65 million in public funds through corruptly obtained
public works contracts.181 President Kirchner had sought to quash
the investigation in Argentina by firing the prosecutor who
originally reported his findings of corruption.182 The action in
Nevada reinforced and exacerbated the corruption allegations and
threatened to lead to further revelations. The leading Argentinian
newspapers reported on the U.S. litigation, including the U.S.
court’s finding that the creditors had proven that public funds had
been embezzled.183
In Argentina’s dispute with holdouts, the link between
information revealed about corruption by the creditors’ litigation
efforts and the state’s decision to settle is less clear than in the
Congo case. That is because the pari passu ruling and the related
injunctions placed such intense pressure on Argentina, and because
President Kirchner’s party no longer controlled the executive
branch when the debt was settled. However, the case suggests how
litigation might credibly threaten to unseat politicians, especially in
democracies, who are susceptible to corruption allegations and
unwilling to pay creditors.
C. Issue Framing by Litigants
Courts allow litigants to argue publicly over the relevant norms
and how they apply to the parties’ behavior. The other reputationshaping institutions that operate in this market have internal, topdown agenda-setting processes and lack the public aspect of courts
that allows them to perform this function. As described above,
credit ratings seek to produce systematic deductions from a
181. See NML Capital, 2014 WL 3898021 at *2–5.
182. See Prosecutor Campagnoli to Remain Suspended, BUENOS AIRES HERALD (Dec. 24, 2013),

http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/148187/prosecutor-campagnoli-to-remain-suspended.
183. See Un caso que comienza a afianzar las sospechas [A Case that Begins to Reinforce
Suspicions], LA NACION (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1777054-un-caso-que
-comienza-a-afianzar-las-sospechas; Daniel Santoro, Un juez de EE.UU., tras las empresas
atribuidas a Báez [A U.S. Judge, After the Companies Attributed to Baez], CLARIN (Aug. 13, 2014),
https://opisantacruz.com.ar/2014/08/13/un-juez-de-ee-uu-tras-las-empresas-atribuidas
-a-baez/.
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compilation of various qualitative and quantitative data inputs. To
produce ratings that allow comparison across the matrix of not only
sovereign but all debt issuers,184 CRAs follow defined methodologies that set out the factors and weights by which they assess
sovereign creditworthiness. While CRAs, like courts, take in
information from market participants, they run that information
through their own rigid framework of relevant factors and weights.
But CRAs are poorly placed to highlight new or idiosyncratic issues
or to give the disputing parties a platform in which to do so.
Similarly, the IMF has a mission much broader than the particular
concerns of debt holders.
During litigation, by contrast, although the parties’ arguments
are somewhat constrained by the applicable legal rules, they have
space to highlight issues they deem relevant or want to make
salient, or to press changes to the law. Recourse to courts gives the
parties a forum in which to shape the norms by which others
should judge the parties’ behavior. This dynamic of sovereign debt
litigation accords with Michael Reisman’s theory of international
law as a process of communication185 and Avner Greif’s theory of
how economic actors change “the rules of the game” over the long
run by institutional development that supplies new information or
changes payoffs.186 Greif names courts and credit bureaus as two
paradigmatic examples of such institutions.187 In sovereign debt
litigation, courts vie institutionally with other sources of information
about sovereign creditworthiness and related behavior.188
While the IMF deemphasizes corruption and CRAs consider it
as but one among a host of relevant factors, creditors use the courts

184. See GAILLARD, supra note 113, at 16.
185. Cf. W. Michael Reisman, The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture, International

Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101, 105–07 (1981)
(discussing the theory of international lawmaking as a product of communications among
groups, which “are, perforce, communications networks” in which participants contend to
shape norms through various available channels).
186. See Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912, 915–16 (1994).
187. Id.
188. Cf. PAUDYN, supra note 124, at 1–2 (discussing a contest between sovereigns and
credit rating agencies to “constitute what counts as authoritative knowledge in the market”).
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to place it front and center.189 This allows them to reframe the
reputational dispute between themselves and the government of
the sovereign debtor. Sovereigns frame litigation by holdout
creditors as preying on the population of indebted countries.190 By
using litigation to uncover corruption, creditors have been able to
offer a competing frame, arguing that it is not they but the
government that is preying on the population, impoverishing the
country by stealing public funds that could be used to repay creditors.191
In the Congo litigation,192 the court’s analysis raised
accountability issues, not only for the leaders of Congo but also for
Western governments and multilateral financial institutions that
had agreed to provide debt relief to the country. The court spoke
directly to an issue that was the subject of heated controversy:
whether development aid should be conditional on good
government within recipient countries, and if so, to what extent.
The United Kingdom had recently expressed strong opposition to
the World Bank’s efforts to withhold aid from countries known to
have severe corruption problems. The United Kingdom had
announced it would withhold funds from the Bank in response.193
The UK court quoted at length from a World Bank document
189. See Interview with Senior Anti-corruption Activist (July 18, 2017) (“The IMF
would say it’s not their job to [assiduously investigate corruption]. But why are these
countries getting debt relief when they are having huge revenues coming in that are just
not properly managed[?]”).
190. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer VI (Aug. 22, 2017) (“The country is
getting poor, and some NY hedge fund is getting very rich.”).
191. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyers III and IV (July 29, 2017) (“It’s the
corrupt regimes that tend not to want to deal fairly with their creditors.”). A journalist who
has reported extensively on sovereign debt described how a creditor that had obtained
discovery about corruption by the leaders of the Republic of Congo approached him about
reporting that information and then was displeased that, in reporting it, the journalist
highlighted that the creditor’s purpose was to recover money. In the journalist’s telling, the
creditor wanted the emphasis placed on the government’s bad actions and believed that
highlighting the creditor’s profit motive undermined the reputational hit of the information.
See Interview with Felix Salmon (July 28, 2017).
192. See discussion supra notes 165–179 and accompanying text.
193. Heather Marquette, The World Bank’s Fight Against Corruption, 8 BROWN J. WORLD
AFF., Spring/Summer 2007, at 27, 28; Hilary Benn, Full Text of Hilary Benn’s Speech on
Corruption, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/feb/03
/development.internationalaidanddevelopment; Francis Fukuyama, A Battle Paul Wolfowitz
Can’t Win, AM. INTEREST (Sept. 16, 2006), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2006
/09/16/a-battle-paul-wolfowitz-cant-win.
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announcing the approval of debt relief for the Republic of Congo
and emphasizing that country’s commitment to addressing corruption in its oil sector so that “resources [would] not be hijacked by
vested interests.”194 The court concluded that “[t]he profits of
Coltrade’s oil sales should go to the people of the Congo, not to
those who rule it or their families.”195
The litigation exemplifies how creditors can challenge, through
the courts, the framing of the dispute and even norms of broader
relevance than the core underlying legal dispute. The official sector,
and most private-sector creditors, were prepared to forgive most of
the country’s debt, and the multilateral financial institutions were
preparing a debt-relief package. The existence of severe corruption
in the country was no secret. However, the public sector supported
a soft response and was willing to accept commitments by the
government to reduce corruption over the long term in exchange
for immediate debt forgiveness and aid. The prospect of publicsector carrots and sticks induced most private-sector creditors to
accept this approach, but Kensington rejected it. Kensington
advocated a harder line against Congo and, rhetorically, against
corrupt regimes generally.196
Using the courts as a platform, and the information obtained
through litigation as supporting reasons, it advocated a
fundamentally different normative approach to sovereign debt
obligations. It framed the soft approach of the official sector as
promoting theft from the people of Congo and donor-country
taxpayers. It found allies in transparency NGOs, equipped them
with the information revealed through discovery, 197 and received
the UK court’s imprimatur on its assessment of the situation. The
litigation led to action in the UK Parliament and U.S. Congress.198
The creditor also kept its perspective salient among financial
market actors. Coverage by a sovereign investment research firm of
Congo’s restructuring agreement with private-sector creditors
exemplifies how litigation supported creditors’ persistent

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

546

See Long Beach Ltd. v. Glob. Witness Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB), [47] (Eng.).
See id. at [49].
Friedman, supra note 173.
Interview with Senior Anti-corruption Activist (July 18, 2017).
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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opposition to the prevailing norm of debt forgiveness despite
known corruption. An article announcing the country’s bond issue
was titled, “Congo Debt Deal Fuels Debate: IMF Praises London
Club Restructuring, but Doubts Raised on the Government’s Use of
New Funds.”199 The article features laudatory statements by a
private-sector creditor that participated in the restructuring and by
the IMF about the government’s handling of the restructuring. But
those statements are counterweighted by the skepticism of a Global
Witness representative and a description of the country’s efforts to
obtain an injunction to block the NGO’s publication of documents
obtained through litigation by Kensington showing corruption.200
The Global Witness representative highlighted that information
revealed by Kensington’s litigation falsified other assurances the
government gave to the IMF.201
Sovereigns pursuing counter-reputational strategies against
holdouts face an additional difficulty when those creditors succeed
in court. During its disputes with distressed debt funds, Argentina
disparaged the hedge funds as illegitimate “vultures” and
eventually expanded its attacks to include U.S. courts and Judge
Griesa of the Southern District of New York.202 Argentina’s
sustained attacks on the courts reportedly helped drive the judge
to fashion the powerful equitable remedy that accompanied the pari
passu ruling.203
D. Other Mechanisms
At least two other informational mechanisms might be at work.
The first is the ability of litigation to increase the salience of a
dispute with potential investors and other relevant publics, such as
those of donor and debtor countries. A sovereign incurs additional
199. Philip Alexander, Congo Debt Deal Fuels Debate: IMF Praises London Club
Restructuring, but Doubts Raised on the Government’s Use of New Funds, GLOBAL CAP. (Dec. 13,
2007), http://www.globalcapital.com/article/yvy2gx7nmh8h/congo-debt-deal-fuels-debate.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Joseph Ax & Andrew Chung, Argentina Threatened with Contempt Order by U.S.
Judge, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-debt-idUSKB
N0G81GB20140809; Economia: “Nuevamente, Griesa llama a una audiencia y no resuelve absolutamente nada” [The Economy: “Once Again, Griesa Calls a Hearing and Resolves Absolutely
Nothing”], 91.1 FM RADIO SIETE (Sept. 8, 2014), http://radiosiete.com.ar/economia-nueva
mente-griesa-llama-a-una-audiencia-y-no-resuelve-absolutamente-nada/.
203. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer I (July 12, 2017).
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reputational costs as the allegations against it are made newly
salient each time a plaintiff initiates a new action against it or
succeeds in some phase of litigation. A creditor can use the
occasions of milestones in litigation to draw renewed media
attention to a dispute. As a senior sovereign debt lawyer explained,
A skillful [plaintiffs’] lawyer will do something that gets a
front-page headline every six months. This tends to scare
prospective investors and prospective underwriters. It generally
lends a sense of being under siege to the country. That will be
inconsistent with the next Minister of Finance’s desire to portray
Ruritania as open for business . . . .204

This mechanism was at work during the holdouts’ relentless
pursuit of Argentina across continents for years until the state
finally settled. As another senior sovereign debt lawyer explained,
[They go] to court to highlight that this is a deadbeat debtor; get a
judgment against them and publicize it . . . . The creditors knew
full well that some 15-year-old Argentine frigate is not going to
help them recover billions of dollars of debt. It got them tons of
publicity; it was embarrassing.205

This dynamic might be attributed to an emotional aspect of
reputation that allows court drama to escalate negative reputational signals.206 But it is not necessary to resort to emotion-based
theories to explain why litigation can increase the salience of a
breach. Litigation has high salience because of the unique
institutional features of courts discussed above. The “public-ness”
of courts, especially, gives litigation greater salience, in two senses.
Courts put information about the dispute into the public domain,
making it easier for the press and other information disseminators
to report on the dispute.207 Additionally, much of the public views
courts as institutions that do, or are supposed to, impartially apply
widely accepted rules of behavior, determine the truth, and offer

204. Id.
205. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyer II (July 19, 2017).
206. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE

EMOTIONS (1988) (describing how emotions affect reputation apart from objective considerations).
207. Email exchange with Felix Salmon (July 28, 2017) (on file with author).
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recourse for wrongs.208 That perception of the role of courts gives
their decisions on disputes between particular parties a moral
weight that makes the public more attentive to judicial pronouncements than it is to pronouncements of other institutions on the
same dispute.
A second mechanism is national pride. While standard
economic theory predicts that the effectiveness of reputation is
determined by its effect on future transactions, it might also be that
pride in the standing of one’s nation in the world drives decisions
about whether to repay creditors. All else equal, this factor could
cut either in favor of or against repayment. Many observers view
the temporary arrest in Ghana of an antique Argentine navy frigate
because of creditors’ actions as a deep wound to Argentine national
pride.209 Some countries are said to scrupulously repay debts
because they want to be seen as, and see themselves as, the kind of
nation that repays debts.210 To the extent this factor is at play, it
might increase the leverage creditors get by calling debtor nations
to account for their behavior and embroiling them in litigation in
courts around the world.
E. Information Provision as a Public Good
Norm shaping and the public provision of information relevant
to third parties are public goods and, therefore, might be expected
to be underprovided. I use the term “public good” as it is used in
economic parlance—to refer to things that satisfy human wants and
are both non-excludable and non-rivalrous—without taking a
position on whether the shaping of norms by sovereign creditors is
good as a matter of morality or public policy. One market
208. See Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences
and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1639–40 (2015); Tom Tyler
& Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth,
Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1095 (2014); The State of
State Courts: A 2014 NCSC Public Opinion Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc
.org/2014survey (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
209. See, e.g., Ed Stocker, Argentina Welcomes Home Ship Held in Ghana by US ‘Vulture Fund,’
UK INDEPENDENT (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/Americas/ar
gentina-welcomes-home-ship-held-in-ghana-by-us-vulture-fund-8445151.html.
210. Cf. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie
eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) (arguing that people desire the moral approbation of
others and wish to see themselves as worthy of that approval).
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participant put the point aptly: “They’re not trying to change the
course of society; they want to get paid.”211
From the litigating creditor’s point of view, a collective action
problem might appear in this context as follows: creditors could
hold their debt and wait for one creditor to litigate to develop the
law or frame the dispute in a manner that puts pressure on
sovereigns to settle with creditors. The litigating creditor would
then not reap the entire benefit of suing and, therefore, might sue
less often than would be efficient. The potential for free riding is
greatest in the early phases of litigation, when issues of law and fact
that are common to multiple creditors have not yet been resolved.
For example, the champerty issue was an open legal question that,
once resolved in favor of particular holdouts in early cases, created
precedent that benefitted other holdouts.212
This incentive structure is present in litigation generally and is
not limited to reputation-driven litigation. Several factors mitigate
the collective action problem in the context of distressed sovereign
debt. Holding out against sovereign debtors is a high-risk investment strategy pursued nearly exclusively by a handful of
specialized investment funds that buy distressed sovereign debt on
the secondary market. They are long-term, repeat players who have
incentives to invest in developing the law, establishing their
reputations as aggressive creditors and reframing sovereign debt
disputes as contests between corrupt governments and good-faith
creditors. The expertise required to be a successful distressed
sovereign debt investor imposes high startup costs to entering the
market.213 Moreover, many institutional investment funds have
regulatory incentives and strategy mandates that cause them to sell
debt that is in default or whose credit rating drops below a certain
211. Interview with Senior Market Participant I (July 18, 2017).
212. See discussion, supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text.
213. See Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Professional (July 22, 2017) (“[T]he bulk

of the market are people who buy, sell, trade, and have mandates or certain funds that say
things they can and can’t do . . . . The bulk of the market simply does not have the mandate
to be holdouts.”); Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017); Kate Allen, Venezuela
Debt Reaches Flashpoint in Political Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com
/content/2f3beaa0-7c59-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c (quoting fund portfolio manager saying
“that the due diligence and monitoring needed to keep up to date with the risks” of
Venezuela’s debt “are excessive” for many emerging market bond investors and that
distressed debt investors are entering the market for Venezuelan debt).
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threshold.214 This market structure enables specialized distressed
debt investors to maintain supernormal profits that counteract the
collective action problems posed by investing in litigation.
Additionally, much of the leverage gained by distressed debt
investors derives from their ability to establish themselves as
credible “squeaky wheels.” This is especially true in disputes with
so-called recalcitrant debtors. Some of the most experienced
sovereign debt litigators explained their approach:
The strategy that is devised to get payment is not just focused on
particular assets to be found outside the country at issue but to
allow the political forces at play within the country to know that
this is an obligation that needs to be dealt with . . . . that it’s in their
interest to deal with us rather than to not deal with us.215

Other creditors who might seek to swoop in when an aggressive
holdout is on the verge of settling will not have the same credibility
as entities that must be dealt with. Consider creditors that pursue a
strategy of uncovering corruption. Their leverage over the
government is the threat of continuing to pursue discovery through
enforcement actions that will uncover additional information about
corruption. The litigating creditor’s past success and demonstrated
willingness to pursue this strategy aggressively are specific to it.
Moreover, the creditor might have information it has not made
public that poses a credible threat of likely further success through
continued discovery. All of those factors limit the ability of other
holdouts to free ride on one holdout’s litigation victories. Finally,
courts have declined to grant relief to free-riding creditors that have
attempted to collect damages based on the success of holdouts in
achieving settlement.216
IV. CONCLUSION
The account given here of the function of courts in the sovereign
debt market speaks to debates in the economics literature on
214. See Partnoy, supra note 122, at 690; Interview with Investment Analyst (May 28, 2017).
215. Interview with Senior Sovereign Debt Lawyers III and IV (July 29, 2017).
216. See White Hawthorne, LLC v. Republic of Arg., No. 16-cv-1042, 2016 WL 7441699

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016) (dismissing action by bondholders that first sued Argentina in 2016,
when settlement was pending, claiming that the pari passu clause in their bonds entitled them
to payment along with Argentina’s settlement with the litigating holdout creditors).
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sovereign debt and offers broader lessons about reputational
enforcement and the role of courts in dispute resolution.
A body of research on the economics and law of sovereign debt
attributes to reputation a dominant role in sustaining the sovereign
lending market.217 Courts are recognized as playing a marginal role
as an institution with limited coercive sanctioning power.218 The
two mechanisms of litigation and reputation are seen as occupying
separate hemispheres. On this view, creditors rely heavily on
reputation to incentivize repayment, and they can increase pressure if necessary by layering on legal costs.219 Some scholars of
sovereign debt have even challenged reputational theories by
arguing that such theories cannot explain why sovereigns would
offer creditors recourse to foreign courts.220
This Article builds on the literature attributing the functioning
of the sovereign debt market to reputation, while also accounting
for the market’s observed recourse to the law and courts. Whereas
reputation and legal enforcement have long been conceived of as
substitutes or, at most, complements that work through different
mechanisms, this Article shows that courts can play a key role in
reputational governance.
In addition, this Article offers a thicker description of how
reputation operates in the sovereign debt market. This fuller
account speaks to additional questions raised in the theoretical and
empirical literature about whether reputation can really be effective
in sustaining the observed levels of lending to risky sovereigns.
Reputational accounts of sovereign lending have been challenged
on theoretical grounds. One argument is that states that renege on
their debt can turn to self-insurance. That is, they can use excess
cash available in good times to buy financial assets and then rely on
the returns from those assets in bad times. Because sovereigns can
turn to self-insurance, they have the option of breaching their debt
contracts and then withdrawing from lending markets.221 Another

217. See Panizza et al., supra note 1; Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is
to Forgive to Forget?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 43 (1989).
218. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Introduction.
219. See Panizza et al., supra note 1, at 1, 14.
220. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 56.
221. See Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 6.
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objection to reputational theories is the possibility that a future
government might not value access to capital markets.222 Some
scholars have questioned reputational accounts on empirical
grounds because some studies have found that defaulting states do
not face extended exclusion from capital markets or significantly
higher borrowing rates.223
The broader account of reputation presented here responds to
those challenges by showing that the reputation that matters is not
only reputation with prospective lenders. This account moves
beyond a unitary model of the state and accounts for a broader set
of incentives facing the agents of the state who decide whether to
pay foreign creditors. In addition to capital markets, politicians face
potential consequences in domestic politics and international
relations. The existence of multiple relevant social fields populated
by actors having non-identical preferences increases the options
available to creditors for exerting reputational pressure, including
through litigation.
This Article does not claim that reputation is the sole
enforcement mechanism in the sovereign debt market. It does not
argue that the only thing that creditors are seeking or that courts
are providing in sovereign debt litigation is information that will
damage the debtor’s reputation. It does not estimate what
proportion of lending to sovereigns is supported by reputational
enforcement, what proportion is supported by reputational
enforcement specifically aided by courts, or what proportion of
sovereign debt litigation is explained by reputational enforcement.
What it does is show, through a thick empirical description that
comports with theoretical predictions, that courts play a pivotal
role in reputational enforcement in a market that is widely
recognized to depend heavily on that type of enforcement. It
thereby sheds new light not only on how sovereign debt markets
function but also on how reputation operates and how courts
influence behavior in markets.
Contracts scholars have studied an array of cases in which
close-knit communities and industries characterized by repeat play
function because of reputational enforcement. As these informal

222. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 55.
223. See Tomz & Wright, supra note 46, at 247, 260–61.
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economic exchange networks become more complex, reputation is
sometimes supported by private arbitration based on rules chosen
by industry players. The case of sovereign debt illustrates that
reputation supported by a legal adjudicator can work in an
additional set of cases. The case study presented here suggests a
framework for assessing the likely effectiveness of courts as
reputation intermediaries in a given market or social field. Courts
will tend to be effective as information intermediaries when
information dissemination costs are low, the economic costs of
reputational damage are high, and verification costs are high but
are relatively lower for courts than for other information
intermediaries. Additionally, the value at stake must be sufficiently
high to render a non-breaching party’s threat to litigate credible.
Those general criteria can be made more specific. Adjudication
without enforcement is more likely to be an effective form of
governance when market participants are less anonymous, have
longer time horizons, have more homogeneous preferences, and
are subject to greater reputation spillover effects. The ability of
courts to provide information relevant to actors in multiple social
fields in which market participants operate increases their
effectiveness as reputation intermediaries. So does the ability of
courts to produce information that is central to the concerns of third
parties, with the power to sanction or refuse to deal with a
breaching party, where those third parties are not particularly
concerned about the breach that forms the core of the dispute.224
This latter capacity becomes more important as the preferences of
prospective transactors become more heterogeneous.
Are there things that can be done to expand or contract the
scope of governance by reputation through adjudication? A first
step toward increasing the scope of reputation adjudication in
commercial transactions would be to increase the transparency of
dispute resolution. Policymakers and scholars have raised concerns
about the secrecy of arbitration. But state and federal courts decide
a large percentage of matters—as many as ninety-seven percent—

224. In the sovereign debt context, courts have produced information about corruption
that hurt government officials’ reputation with third parties that were not sympathetic to the
creditors’ claims. See supra notes 158–183 and accompanying text.
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without publishing reasoned decisions.225 One way lawmakers
could increase the potential scope of reputational enforcement
mediated by courts is by requiring courts to publish decisions.
Lawyers and regulators can increase the salience of judicial
decisions through public relations efforts. However, there are limits
to this approach, including the attention spans of the press and the
public. Some matters attract more attention than others. Nonetheless, a long-term strategy of cultivating public concern about an
issue, together with litigation, might hold promise for shaping
behavior where existing legal remedies are weak.
Conversely, perhaps policymakers should be more concerned
about overdeterrence from litigation’s reputation effects. Others
have observed that, when calibrating remedies, policy makers
should account for reputational effects.226 This case study offers
insights into how policy makers might analyze the reputational
impact of litigation and other forms of dispute resolution that
release public information about disputing parties.
Finally, the analysis presented in this paper has implications for
law and development. The global development establishment has
embraced a diagnosis of ineffective or absent contract enforcement
institutions as the leading cause of economic underdevelopment.
Law reform efforts frequently seek to implement Western-style,
formalistic, judicially backed contract institutions.227 There has
been controversy among scholars and practitioners of law and
development about the ability to import Western-style legal
institutions into non-Western countries. Such efforts might fail
because, among other reasons, they conflict with local norms and
social structures. While the analysis presented in this paper does
not offer a specific prescription for law and development practice,
it suggests that law reformers seeking to promote economic
development might realize their goal of lowering contracting risk

225. See Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L.
REV. 973, 988 (2008); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (2004).
226. See R OBERT D. COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING
TORTS, CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 187–206 (2014).
227. Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 900–03 (2008); Michael
Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic
Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517 (2006).
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by tapping into existing local social networks. Institutions that
employ court-like information-producing features might raise the
cost of breaching contracts even without conventional Westernstyle enforcement mechanisms.
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Courts as Information Intermediaries

APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY
The reputational theory of sovereign debt litigation emerged
from the observation of published information about the sovereign
debt market and related litigation. Published sources included
sovereign bond indentures; judicial decisions; scholarly accounts of
the market and related litigation; the documentation of relevant
institutions such as credit rating agencies, trade associations, and
multilateral public-sector lenders; and press reports.228 I interpreted
the information from those sources in light of the assumption that
the sophisticated actors in this context are instrumentally rational.
I assume, for instance, that investors seek to maximize the value of
their investments and that they pursue litigation in service of that
end. Public information about sovereign debt disputes suggests
that courts might serve a reputational function that holdout
creditors view as a means of increasing the returns on their
investments. Sophisticated professionals might be expected to be
conscious of and able to articulate the strategies they and their
organizations pursue to achieve their ends.
Therefore, to check the fit of the reputational theory, I identified
interview subjects using a supplemented snowball sampling
method.229 The sample is not random or statistically representative.
I sought instead to interview people with experience in each role I
had identified as being important to the functioning of reputational
enforcement in this context.230 I sought to ascertain whether the
professionals’ accounts of their actions and decision-making
processes, and those of the organizations they represented, comported with the theory. As I learned more about how reputation
functions in this market, about information being provided by
courts and other sources, and about how people and organizations
228. For a description of the method of building theory from cases, see Kathleen M.
Eisenhardt & Melissa E. Graebner, Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges, 50
ACAD. MGMT. J. 25 (2007).
229. In snowball sampling, earlier interview subjects recommend others for future
interviews who have the characteristics of interest for the research. JOHN LOFLAND, DAVID
SNOW , LEON ANDERSON & LYN H. LOFLAND, ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO
QUALITATIVE OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS 43 (4th ed. 2006). I combined snowball sampling
with targeted searches for professionals having experience in relevant roles.
230. Such “purposeful sampling” is appropriate for selecting people who know about
the phenomenon of interest, especially where that phenomenon plays out among a small,
specialized social group. See JOHN W. CRESWELL & VICKI L. PLANO CLARK, DESIGNING AND
CONDUCTING MIXED METHODS RESEARCH (2d ed. 2011).
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were using that information, I expanded the categories of professional experience from which to seek interview subjects.
I conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty professionals with substantial experience in one of the following activities: advising on sovereign creditworthiness or on whether to buy
or sell sovereign debt; deciding whether to buy or sell sovereign
debt; deciding whether and how to invest in the territory of a
sovereign debtor; suing a sovereign debtor; deciding whether to
sue a sovereign debtor; issuing or restructuring sovereign debt;
advising on transactions with foreign sovereigns; or providing
information about sovereign behavior through an official multilateral institution, the press, a trade association, or a non-governmental public interest organization.
Interviews were conducted confidentially to encourage forthrightness, unless the interviewee requested attribution. Interviews
were typically forty-five minutes to one hour long, though one was
thirty minutes, and several were over an hour. To mitigate the
accuracy limits of interview research, where possible I triangulated
information obtained from interviews with other sources, including other interviews and publicly available information. The
descriptions I use to identify the interview subjects balance offering
enough detail to show the basis for their knowledge with protecting
their confidentiality. To further protect interviewees’ confidentiality, I use male pronouns for all interview subjects.
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